# **BULLETIN** of Mariupol State University

## Series: History. Political Studies

## **COLLECTION OF RESEARCH PAPERS**

Founded in 2011

**ISSUE 21** 



Mariupol - 2018

Bulletin of Mariupol State University

Series: History. Political Studies

Collection of research papers

Issued thrice a year. Founded in 2011

The publication is authorized by the Scientific Council of Mariupol State University

(Record 11, dated May 17<sup>th</sup>, 2018)

The journal is indexed in the international scientific journal database

"Index Copernicus International" (Poland)

The journal is indexed in the informational and analytical system "Russian Science Citation

Index"

**General Editorial Board:** 

Editor-in-Chief: corresponding member of the National Academy of Pedagogical Sciences of Ukraine, Sc. D. (Political Studies), Professor K. Balabanov

Executive Editor: Sc. D. (Economics), Professor O. Bulatova

Members of the Editorial Board:

Sc. D. (Philology), Professor S. Bezchotnikova, Sc. D. (History), Professor V. Romantsov, Sc. D. (Cultural Studies), Professor Y. Sabadash, Sc. D. (Law), Professor M. Shelukhin, Sc. D. (Economics), Professor Y.Chentukov

Editorial Board of the Series:

Editor-in-Chief: corresponding member of the National Academy of Pedagogical Sciences of Ukraine, Sc. D. (Political Studies), Professor K. Balabanov

Executive Editor: Sc. D. (History), Professor V. Romantsov

Executive Secretary: Ph. D. (Political Studies), Associate Professor M. Trofymenko

#### Members of the Editorial Board:

Sc. D. (Political Studies), Professor V. Voinalovych, Sc. D. (History), Professor A. Hedio,
Sc. D. (History), Professor I. Gridina, Sc. D. (History), Professor O. Hurzhii, Sc. D. (Political Studies), Professor H. Zelenko, Sc. D. (History), Professor V. Lysak, Sc. D. (Political Studies), Sc. D. (History), Professor R. Litvinenko, Professor Y. Makar, Sc. D. (Political Studies), Professor I. Onyshchenko, Sc. D. (Political Studies), Professor N. Pachina, Sc. D. (History), Professor I. Ponomariova, Sc. D. (History), Professor O. Reient, Sc.D. (Political Studies), Professor S. Rymarenko, Sc.D. (Social Studies), Professor B. Sliushchynskyi, Sc. D. (History), Professor O. Styazhkina, Sc. D. (History), Professor N. Temirova.

Foreign Experts: Sc. D. (Political Studies), Professor S. K. Bhardwaj (India), Sc. D. (Political Studies), Professor T. Graziani (Italian Republic), Sc. D. (Political Studies), Professor C. Karnassiotis (Greek Republic), Sc. D. (History), Sc. D. (Political Studies), Professor S. Cornea (Moldova Republic), Sc. D. (History), Professor P.-R. Magosci (Canada), Sc. D. (Political Studies), Professor A. Makarychev (Estonia), Sc.D. (Political Studies), Professor A. Romano (Italian Republic), Sc.D. (Political Studies), Professor S. H. S. Soherwordi (Pakistan), Sc.D. (Political Studies), Professor M. Khan (USA).
 Scientific Secretary: Ph. D. (History) S. Arabadzhy

Founded by Mariupol State University 129a Budivelnykiv Ave., Mariupol, 87500 Tel.: (0629) 53-22-60, e-mail: visnyk.mdu.istoria.politologia@gmail.com Web-page: www.visnyk-politologia.mdu.in.ua Certificate of state registration for print media (Series KB №17802 -6652P dated May 24<sup>th</sup>, 2011) 8 1521 (Online)

ISSN 2518-1521 (Online) ISSN 2226-2830 (Print)

© Mariupol State University, 2018

### CONTENTS

### **HISTORICAL SCIENCE**

Hedo A.	6
THE MATERIALS OF PERSONAL ORIGIN AS A SOURCE FROM JEWS' HISTORY	
IN THE SOUTH OF UKRAINE AT THE END OF THE XVIII – EARLY XX	
Golovko A., Nikolchenko M., Nikolchenko T.	6
VERTEP OF THE RIGHT-BANK AND THE LEFT-BANK UKRAINE: DEVELOPMENT	
PROBLEMS AND NATIONAL PECULIARITIES	
Zayonchkovskiy Yu., Romanova S.	7
TO THE QUESTION OF DATING OF THE END OF POLITICAL CAREER OF JOCHID	
KHAN MUHAMMAD b. TIMUR	
Kasyanova M.	8
SOURCES OF THE STUDY OF MIGRATION OF UKRAINIANS OF THE EAST-	
EUROPEAN VECTOR	
Marchenko S.	8
NEW FORMS OF LABOR ORGANIZATION IN AGRICULTURE OF UKRAINE IN 80-	
TIES OF XX CENTURY	
Mykhtunenko V.	9
THE IMAGE OF I. HURLIAND IN RUSSIAN HISTORIOGRAPHY	
Nikolchenko Y., Miroshnik V.	10
SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF PROVISIONAL DOCUMENTATION IN UKRAINIAN	
LANDS OF THE XVI CENTURY	
Novikova S.	11
DEVELOPMENT OF MARIUPOL CITY'S INFRASTRUCTURE (XIX – EARLY XX)	
Tsetsyk Ya.	12
MATERIALS OF THE PERIODIC PRESS AS SOURCE OF RESEARCH OF	
ELECTIONS ARE ON VOLHYNIA IN 1906 – 1907	
POLITICAL SCIENCE	
Ralausava N	13

	15
GLOBAL CITIES AS A SOURCE OF SOFT POWER IN XXI CENTURY	
Bidochko L.	13
CULTURAL MATERIALISM OF M.HARRIS AS AN ATTEMPT TO CREATE A NEW	
SCIENTIFIC PARADIGM	
Boyarska O.	14
POLITICAL ADVERTISING IN THE ORGANIZATIONAL AND PLANNING	
CONTEXT OF MODERN POLITICAL TECHNOLOGIES APPLICATION	
Buchyn M., Kurus Y.	15
INFORMATION WAR AS AN ELEMENT OF RUSSIAN AGGRESSION AGAINST	
UKRAINE AT THE MODERN STAGE	
Halona A.	23
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND ASSOCIATIONS FOR THE	
PARTICIPATION OF CENTRAL ASIAN COUNTRIES AND UKRAINE	
Gotsulyak V.	24
UKRAINIAN STATE IDEA IN THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF THE COSSACK ERA	

<b>Demidenko O.</b> THE NATURE OF INTELLECTUAL MIGRATION: DEFINITION OF THE TERM AND	24
CONCEPTUAL APPROACHES TO ITS CHARACTERISTICS	
Zabavska K. THE MAIN APPROACHES TO THE INTERPRETATION OF THE SYSTEM OF	25
CHECKS AND BALANCES IN UKRAINIAN POLITICAL SCIENCE	
Zabiian V.	32
SPECIFICS OF THE SYSTEM APPROACH APPLICATION IN POLITICAL SCIENCE	
(ON EXAMPLE OF CHINA'S MEMBERSHIP IN BRICS)	
Zvezdova O.	33
POTENTIAL VARIANTS OF THE CONFLICTS DEVELOPMENT AROUND DE	
FACTO STATES IN THE POST-SOVIET SPACE	34
<b>Katerynchuk P.</b> CHALLENGES AND THREATS OF UKRAINE'S NATIONAL CYBER SECURITY IN	54
HYBRID WAR	
Kolomiiets O.	41
THE GLOBALIZATIONAL PRIORITIES OF THE MODERN FOREIGN POLICY OF	
POLAND	
Lavryk I.	42
ALIENATION AS A FACTOR OF POLITICAL APATHY AND POLITICAL	
ABSENTEEISM	
Lubinets D.	43
ANGLO-SAXON AND CONTINENTAL MODELS OF REGULATING LOBBYISM:	
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS	
Makhsma S.	44
MARIUPOL: STRATEGY 2021 AS WAYS TO IMPROVE THE CITY AND THE	
COMMUNITY Parliatanka O	44
<b>Pavliatenko O.</b> THE INTERNAL POLITICAL CONDITIONS FOR THE EMERGENCE OF	44
SEPARATISM IN UKRAINE	
Pashyna N., Pelykh H.	45
THE REGIONAL LEADERSHIP AS THE STABILITY FACTOR OF THE MODERN	10
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS	
Poiarkova T.	45
MIGRATIO FLOWS AT OCCUPIED TERRITORIES OF UKRAIN AS A MEANS OF	
«NEW» WARFARE	
Proskurina O.	54
MYPHIOLOGICAL MEASUREMENT OF POLITICAL CULTURE: THEORETICAL	
BASIS AND POLITICAL PRACTICE	
Ryabinin Y.	55
SEPARATISM AND METHODOLOGY OF ITS REVEALING	50
<b>Tatai E.</b> CLASSIFICATION OF PUBLIC ORGANIZATIONS' ACTIVITIES IN THE CONTEXT	56
OF THE RISKS OF THEIR DESTRUCTIVE INFLUENCE ON SOCIETY	
Trofymenko A.	56
JOINT FORCES OPERATION IN UKRAINE: ITS POLITICAL AND LEGAL BASIS	50

Trofymenko M.				57
ANASTASIOS G. LEVENTIS FOUNDATION AS	S A PUBLIC DIPLO	OMACY INSTITU	UTE	
OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS				
Tupitzya O., Khudyi E.				58
MANAGEMENT OF NONGOVERNMENTAL	ORGANIZATION	NS: STRATEGY	OF	
POLITICAL EFFICIENCY IN TRANZITIVE SO	CIETY			
Turchyn Ya., Ivasechko O.				59
DIPLOMACY WITHOUT DIPLOMATS:	CONCEPTUAL	PRINCIPLES	OF	
PARADIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY				
Shulika A.				59
THE POLITICAL POTENTIAL OF THE CONTR	EMPORARY PREC	CARIAT		

#### **HISTORICAL SCIENCE**

UDK 94(477.7=411.16)"17/19":316.3:008]:82-94

A. Hedo

#### THE MATERIALS OF PERSONAL ORIGIN AS A SOURCE FROM JEWS' HISTORY IN THE SOUTH OF UKRAINE AT THE END OF THE XVIII – EARLY XX

The article analyzes the memoirs that cover the history of Jews in the South of Ukraine. All of them differ by the individual perception of the environment where the authors of the events occured. This perception was the result of the whole set of factors such as the internal development of the society itself and ideological, social, cultural, political and other orientations of the subject. These sources are united by separate plots of the history of Jews and the region, different for the purpose of creation, functional load in which events unfolded, the witness of which the author of the testimony was a witness. Different for the purpose of creating, the functional load of these sources are united by separate subjects of the history of of Jews and the region in which events unfolded, the witness of which or the transmitter of testimony was the author. Materials of personal origin (travel notes, memoirs, diaries) with a special expressive reproduction of living pictures and unique details of the various aspects of the Jews life were based on the memory and personal impressions, the individual experience of participants of the events.

Memoirs (travel notes, memoirs, diaries, autobiographies, letters) are made on the basis of memory and personal impressions, individual experience of participants of events. These documents specifically express the living pictures and unique details of the various aspects of the Jewry. The analyzed memoirs provided diverse, rich, and in some cases unique factual material on the history of Jewry in the South of Ukraine, but they still require a critical analysis using a wide range of sources techniques.

*Key words: Jews, memoirs, travellers' notes, diaries, autobiographies, letters, the Southern Ukraine.* 

#### UDK 394.[2:792.9](477)(045)

#### A. Golovko, M. Nikolchenko, T. Nikolchenko

#### VERTEP OF THE RIGHT-BANK AND THE LEFT-BANK UKRAINE: DEVELOPMENT PROBLEMS AND NATIONAL PECULIARITIES

The article deals with the problem of the origin and peculiarities of vertep of the Right-Bank and the Left-Bank Ukraine during the Baroque period of the Ukrainian culture.

The Ukrainian Christmas vertep is a unique feature of the Ukrainian culture of the 17<sup>th</sup>-18<sup>th</sup> centuries. It has been examined and analysed since the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. Nevertheless the most interesting and important problem has not yet been identified, namely: when did the first vertep performances came into being and what are what are its national peculiarities?

The text of the vertep drama combines book and folklore features. It joins up Christmas drama and satiric everyday-life interlude. The first part is written in the Old Ukrainian bookish language with a lot of church Slavic words. The other one is created by the folk. It is very close to the Modern Ukrainian language with Vertep the exception of its local dialects. Unfortunately no authentic texts of the  $17^{th}$  century vertep drama have been found yet. One can only surmise the contents while studying the texts of second half of  $17^{th}$  – up the beginning of the  $20^{th}$  century.

Vertep was very popular in the regions Volyn, Galicia, Transcarpathia, the region of the Dniester, and Ukrainian Polissja, due to its expressiveness, and vividness of the folklore, folk dancing, songs, jokes and dramatic dialogues. Vertep has much in common with Byelorussian "Belteyka" (cf: Bethlehem), Polish folk puppet-show "Szopka" and Chech vertep "Jeslicek".

Vertep of the Right-Bank and Left-Bank Ukraine was most likely founded in the 16<sup>th</sup> century and it developed into the folk art during the Baroque period. It has become a branch of the national art.

Vertep is rather a complicated artistic phenomenon. Its twofold structure combining "sacred" and "secular" styles, eternity and transience, tragedy and comedy has become a model of the Ukrainian world.

Owing to the folklore vertep has become a natural part of Ukrainian Christmas rites. Combination of folklore and professional traditions, rites and everyday-life features has made vertep the universal form of culture that influenced Modern Ukrainian drama and theatre. Moreover, vertep as a part of Christmas and New Year rites revives in Ukraine as various types of the puppet-show, amateur and professional theatricals.

**Key words:** Right Bank and Left Bank Ukraine, Ukrainian culture of the XVII-XVIII centuries, vertep as a cultural phenomenon, the problem of the emergence of the den, verpet drama, the content of vertepical drama, dialogues, poems, songs, dances, folklore, theater, drama.

UDK 94(5)"14":929

#### Yu. Zayonchkovskiy, S. Romanova

#### TO THE QUESTION OF DATING OF THE END OF POLITICAL CAREER OF JOCHID KHAN MUHAMMAD b. TIMUR

In modern scientific literature there are several variants of dating of death of Jochid khan Küchük Muhammad, most popular of which are: 1459 (the date was proposed by Stanley Lane-Poole), 1466 (Clifford Edmund Bosworth) and 1440-s (A.G. Gaev, A.K. Alekseev, D.N. Masljuzhenko). The ascertainment of this date is important for the chronology of the entire political process of 15-th century.

The paper analyses historians' views on the problem, special attention is paid to the arguments proposed by different scholars. Written sources don't report the date and circumstances of death of this Jochid khan. Historical works by Masud b. Usman Kuhistani «Tarih-i Abu'l-Khayr-hani» and Mahmud b. Amir Wali's "Bahr al-asrar fi manaquib al-akhyar" contain important information, but modern historians interpret and date these facts in different ways.

Review of the opinions expressed by M.G. Safargaliev (1960), B.A. Ahmedov (1965), A.G. Nesterov (2007), D.N. Masljuzhenko (2012), Zh.M. Sabitov (2015), R.Ju. Reva (2017) is given. The arguments and ideas expressed by historians are analyzed.

Summarizing, on the totality of all available information on the main points of discussion, authors can agree with the opinion of D.N. Masljuzhenko:

- mentioned in «Tarih-i Abu'l-Khayr-hani» Ahmad and Mahmud were the sons of Muhammad b. Timur;
- the military campaign with their participation did not occur in the 1430-s, but took place later in the second half of the 1440-s.

Thus, according to the information preserved in written sources, authors came to the conclusion that the death of Muhammad b. Timur occurred, most likely, in the middle of 1440s. His heirs, sons Mahmud and Ahmad, were overthrown and banished by Abu'l-Khayr khan soon after accession and were able to regain the throne only at the end of the 1450-s., after the defeat of khan "of the state of nomadic Uzbeks" from Kalmyks.

Key words: Golden Horde, Jochids, Muhammad b. Timur, Küchük Muhammad, Abu'l-Khayr.

UDK 314.15(477)

#### M. Kasyanova

#### SOURCES OF THE STUDY OF MIGRATION OF UKRAINIANS OF THE EAST-EUROPEAN VECTOR

The article is devoted to the study of the sources of migration of Ukrainians to the East European vector. Comprehensive study of this issue has been carried out on the basis of attracting a wide range of sources. The basis of the source base are official documents. Other elements include official speeches and speeches by statesmen and politicians; sources of personal origin; materials of public organizations; reference and statistical databases; publications in mass media, both printed and electronic. The empirical basis of the study of the problem of attracting Ukrainians to subregional migration processes is determined by a wide range of methodological approaches and developed sources on relevant topics.

The analysis of the empirical base of the research shows that in Ukrainian and foreign sources there is a considerable amount of information on the basis of which it is possible to judge the political and social situation of Ukrainian migrants in the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Moldova and the Russian Federation at the end of the XX - the beginning of the XXI century, the nature of interstate relations in the designated the region and the impact on it of migration issues, the importance of the phenomenon of migration in the context of security categories. In practice, this emphasized the need for structural and systemic approaches to studying materials, implemented with the help of general scientific and special political research tools.

Keywords: sources, migration legislation, migration policy.

UDK 930.1:338.43.021.8(477)"198"

#### S. Marchenko

#### NEW FORMS OF LABOR ORGANIZATION IN AGRICULTURE OF UKRAINE IN 80-TIES OF XX CENTURY

Under the pressure of product crisis in 80-ties of XX century the Soviet government implemented some modernization of agricultural production provided that the collective farms system and soviet production system were preserved.

Based upon numerous archive sources this article reveals the changes that took place in labor organization in agriculture of Ukraine in 1980-ties and defines their inefficiency.

Implementation of brigade and collective contracts system at farms of Ukrainian Soviet Republic went extremely fast. Though this process was mainly formal. Management of collective farms chasing the quantitative index which was imposed on them by higher governance stuck to mainly mechanic transition to collective contracts of all farm branches. But statistic achievements of these indexes did not guarantee any progressive changes in agricultural development.

From the middle of 80-ties in Ukraine a wide spreading of family and personal contracts took place in the sphere of cattle breeding and plant growing. More than a half of all farms employed such system but this didn't bring any significant results generally in the country.

In the second half of 80-ties of XX century in Ukraine there was some spreading of lease relations also. Despite of the higher productivity of lease workers the implementation of the lease relations didn't provide significant improvement in the agriculture in Ukraine. Lease collectives worked in the frames of collective farm and soviet production system and this fact determined their low efficiency.

The attempts of reforms in agriculture in 80-ties in general and implementation of new forms of labor organization in particular were doomed to failure as they didn't touch upon the essence of production relations. Totalitarian state was unable to make qualitative changes in the system of production relations because they demanded the changes of ownership forms. The reason is that the implementation of private ownership itself contradicted the very nature of totalitarian system with its plan-and-distribute economics and state monopoly on production means.

*Key words:* brigade contract, collective contract, family and personal contract, lease relations, collective farms and soviet production system.

UDK 930.2(470+571)

#### V. Mykhtunenko

#### THE IMAGE OF I. HURLIAND IN RUSSIAN HISTORIOGRAPHY

The article is devoted to the study of the evolution of the image of the well-known political and public figure I. Hurliand in Russian historiography. The article compares and gives complex classification of researches of Russian historians and public figures about one of the most influential personalities of Russian history of the early twentieth century – Illia Hurliand.

In the context of studying the general political trends in the development of prerevolutionary Russia, it is important to study the role of individual personalities. One of such

ambiguous and even more interesting personalities was I. Hurliand who was a famous lawyer, historian, professor of the Yaroslavl Demydiv Legal Lyceum, Active state councillor, editor of the governmental periodical "Russia", head of the censorship department "Press Bureau", and the closest associate of the great reformer P. Stolypin.

A feature of the historiographic review of the life and activity of I. Hurliand is the absence of a generalizing work devoted to this persona. The article deals with various directions of historiographic researches since the pre-revolutionary period to the present. Based on the analysis of scientific historical literature the article identified the main tendencies in assessing the personality of I. Hurliand.

Along with the general monographic works that cover the entire aggregate of political events in the Russian Empire at the beginning of the 20th century, there are also modern studies related with the study of the personality of I. Hurliand in the context of the era. The emergence of such historical biographies at the present stage relates to the fact that science requires personification of history to expand the source of research, because the subject of history has always been activities of people.

From the analysis of Russian historiography of the period from the beginning of the twentieth century to the present day, one can conclude that there is no complete work that would characterized the life and activity of the "gray cardinal" of the Russian Empire – Illia Hurliand. However, it is possible to follow up the features of the evolution of the image of I. Hurliand in the context of both modern Russian and Soviet historiography.

Keywords: evolution, historiography, monarchism, personality, autocracy, empire.

UDK 050:651(477)"14/15"(045)

#### Y. Nikolchenko, V. Miroshnik

#### SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF PROVISIONAL DOCUMENTATION IN UKRAINIAN LANDS OF THE XVI CENTURY

Development of documentation in Ukraine of XV–XVI centuries falls on the period when its fate was first determined by the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the Polish Kingdom, and after the Union of Lublin in 1569 – the Commonwealth. During this period, the Ukrainian lands passed several qualitatively different stages of development: from overcoming feudal fragmentation in the absence of their state, until full subordination to the Polish state structure of governance.

The sources of the study were the administrative documents of the XV–XVI centuries of The Grand Lithuanian Duchy, the Polish Kingdom and the Commonwealth, in particular: the Lithuanian metric, the Charter on the Drafts, the Lithuanian Statute in three editions, the Lublin Union, the Duties of the Feudal-Dependent Peasants of Lviv region. These documents were published in the collections of documents on the history and law of Ukraine.

The article topicality is determined by the need to establish the level of scientific study of administrative documentation in the Ukrainian lands in the XV–XVI centuries. (Lithuanian-Polish period in the history and culture of Ukraine). The aim of the article is to search and to study a variety of scientific information on administrative documentation in the Ukrainian lands of the 15th-16th centuries. It includes the classification features of administrative documentation as the initial stage in the formation of domestic documentary tradition. The aim is also to monitor the domestic researchers' works concerning the aforementioned issue and to determine the degree of scientific interest to it in Ukraine.

The following result has been obtained in accordance with the aim:

There was an act system of records keeping, which defined a variety of documents, including administrative, which were meant for principles of personal and social safety of the local population. This act system of record keeping existed in the Ukrainian lands under the rule of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, the Polish Kingdom and the Commonwealth in the XV–XVI centuries.

At the same time, it is untimely to assert that a purely Ukrainian documentation as a system of certain norms and rules emerged, in spite of the constant expansion of the practice of document creation. But, it has been the stage of traditions formation which concerns the development of domestic documentation future and experience accumulation in creating, processing and storing the documents.

The use of scientometric, bibliometric and statistical methods to find out the scientific issues of domestic researchers, concerning the problem of record keeping and documentation in Ukrainian lands of the XV–XVI centuries, give an opportunity to specify not only the circle and the subject of scientific studies, but also to determine the quantitative and qualitative indicator of the use of administrative documents of this period in the history and culture of Ukraine.

**Key words:** Ukrainian lands in the 15th–16th centuries, Grand Duchy of Lithuania, Polish kingdom, Commonwealth, chancery, records keeping, documentation, regulations, classification, bibliometrics, scientometrics, statistical method, information flow, monitoring, scientific studies, professional editions, dissertation researches.

#### UDK 352.07(477.62-2)"18/19"

#### S. Novikova

#### DEVELOPMENT OF MARIUPOL CITY'S INFRASTRUCTURE (XIX – EARLY XX)

The formation and development of Mariupol city's infrastructure in the XIX – early XX centuries was a rather complicated process. In the first half of the XIX century the city remained a small provincial town where increasing population was very slow due to the closeness of the local Greek community. For a variety of reasons, mainly because of lack of funding, many components of the city's economy were in the initial stage. The public services sphere was extremely poorly developed, there were no or not developed systems of water supply and water disposal, transport and the transport routes system and other components of the city's infrastructure.

The situation started changing in the second half of the XIX century, especially after the permission to the representatives of other nationalities to settle down in Mariupol. Expanding population led to significant increase in the extent of constructing residential and administrative buildings, the quality of constructing improved, the number of companies producing building materials increased tenfold.

Especially actively different components of Mariupol city's economy were developed since the XIX – early XX century. It is attributed to founding some large-scale enterprises, city's economic life recovery, increasing population practically eightfold. It is precisely in this period the sufficient modernization of Mariupol city's life took place: the streets were paved; kerosene and then electrical lighting as well as water supply system, telegraph and telephone communication appeared.

Since 1870ies the number of public services enterprises (hotels, cook-shops, coffee houses and pubs) also increased. Health institutions (territorial and city hospitals, private health institutions and pharmacies) appeared. There were founded enterprises producing varied production for the city's population consumer needs (confectionery, sausage, beer, soap and candle works).

To a great extent modernization of Mariupol city life, creating conditions for its economic and social development, intensification of urbanization were promoted by the successful cooperation among the government, local government bodies and entrepreneurial groups.

*Key words: Mariupol, the XIX – early XX century, city's infrastructure, city's economy, housing construction, city's engineering infrastructure, transport infrastructure, public services enterprises.* 

UDK 930.2:324(477.82)"1906/1907"

#### Ya. Tsetsyk

#### MATERIALS OF THE PERIODIC PRESS AS SOURCE OF RESEARCH OF ELECTIONS ARE ON VOLHYNIA IN 1906 – 1907

The article describes the course of pre-election processes to the II Duma in the Volyn province on the press. It was found out that the authors of the publications reflected only the activities of the monarchists, and their opponents were biased. Such a position contributed to the complication of the socio-political life of the region. The role of imperial authorities in strengthening the influence of monarchical structures in the region is analyzed. On the basis of an impartial study, analysis and systematization of documents it is proved that the Black Hundreds in their activity enjoyed the support of the authorities, who were interested in the fact that the deputies of the Duma were representatives of the monarchical structures.

The members of the organization on the pages of the investigative press felt that the opponents of the authorities, to which they uncorrupted the representatives of all political currents, tried to carry out work aimed at easing the armed forces, which had to be used by external and internal enemies. The printing of such materials shows that the Black Hundreds used any means to achieve their goal, not stopping even before direct deception of society.

Conducting such election campaigning shows that one of its tools used by the Black Hundreds was the dissemination of false information about the opponents of the organization, which had to affect their discredit.

Keywords: elections, Volyn, electors, press, political party, Black Hundreds.

### **POLITICAL SCIENCE**

UDK 327.8

#### N. Belousova

#### GLOBAL CITIES AS A SOURCE OF SOFT POWER IN XXI CENTURY

In the modern world, the role of the global city is more and more growing as one of an active agent of international relations and an effective agent of soft power. The article examines the role of cities in the formation of societies characterized by stability, peace and security, the importance of city diplomacy in the formation of soft power strategies is analysed. Cities, that are becoming more powerful and influential, are looking for new forms of cooperation, creating global networks. This creates an opportunity for the city authorities to share their experience, formulate common goals, jointly solve problems and act independently from national governments. The network structures of cities have different formats. These are broad alliances, such as the United Cities and local authorities. UCLG is the largest organization of subnational governments in the world, with over 240,000 members in over 140 UN Member States. It can also be specialized networks, such as the C40 Cities dealing with stability issues. In 2016, the Global Parliament of Mayors was founded in The Hague. This platform has enabled cities to develop their cooperation in solving global problems, share best practices, form a common vision. The Global Parliament of Mayors works with international organizations such as the OECD, the World Bank, the United Nations. At the present stage, the diplomacy carried out by cities and its contribution to national influence are gaining an increasing scale in the international arena. International cooperation and diplomacy at the city level can be an effective tool and resource of "soft power".

*Key words:* soft power, «nontraditional» actors of international relations, global city, city diplomacy, city alliances, international relations of cities.

#### UDK 141.319.8

#### L. Bidochko

#### CULTURAL MATERIALISM OF M.HARRIS AS AN ATTEMPT TO CREATE A NEW SCIENTIFIC PARADIGM

The article addresses the analysis of cultural materialism as a research strategy developed by American cultural anthropologist M. Harris in the 1960s-1970s. This theory is perceived within the context of scientific revolutions (putting in terms of T. Kuhn) in Western anthropology (North American and British ones). In the last third of the nineteenth century, evolutionism, designed by Charles Darwin for biology, has become the first scientific paradigm in the field of knowledge about the man and the society. American researcher H. Morgan and British explorer E. Tylor were considering the studied peoples through the prism of the stages of social evolution. But the accumulation of discrepancies between evolutionary theories and empirical data led to a scientific revolution. At the same time, the specifics of the US and the British Empire predetermined the transition to the new paradigms. In the British case, this was a structural functionalism, which dealt with colonial societies as stable self-sufficient systems.

In the US, historical particularism of F. Boas, based on German idealistic philosophy, triumphed. The school of F. Boas examined individual cultures in their entirety, avoiding generalizations and theorizing. Large-scale researches, conducted in the first half of the XX century, have given empirical materials that could not be adequately explained in the framework of the then scientific paradigms. Turbulent social changes and political events after 1945 also pushed the scientific community to a new scientific revolution on all the continents. But the old paradigms were replaced with a huge number of competing scientific schools, studying man, society, and culture from various perspectives, both materialistic and idealistic. Developing the ideas of neo-evolutionists and cultural ecologists, M. Harris gave priority to researching infrastructure. It allowed focusing on the study of precisely measured factors and, accordingly, scientizing anthropology and social sciences in general, seeking answers to pressing social challenges by joint efforts and on a single metatheoretical basis. M. Harris did not put forward a general theory of social formations (structure) and cultural evolution (superstructure), although offered to reconsider the causes of social and cultural phenomena in the realm of infrastructure; if they do not have sufficient explanatory power, the causal arrow should be directed to the internal dynamics of these levels of social life. Thus, M. Harris refused to co-opt the existing theories, but left their adherents the opportunity to adopt a research strategy for cultural materialism. Proposed by M. Harris, the division of the object of anthropology into the ethical / emotional and behavioral / mental, according to the scientist's plan, had to show the place of the spheres research of various schools in reintegrated general anthropology. Cultural materialism, developed by the American scientist M. Harris, became one of the most successful attempts of creating a new scientific paradigm. But as the further history of science demonstrates, the humanities of the late twentieth century were moving in the other direction – even greater fragmentation and retreating from the natural sciences.

*Key words: anthropology, evolutionism, historical particularism, cultural ecology, cultural materialism, scientific paradigm, sociology of science.* 

#### UDK 32.019.51:316.77

#### **O. Boyarska**

#### POLITICAL ADVERTISING IN THE ORGANIZATIONAL AND PLANNING CONTEXT OF MODERN POLITICAL TECHNOLOGIES APPLICATION

It is proved that political technologies are the systemic background in which the conceptual content of political advertising is considered in the context of a democratic competitive political process. Explained specifics applied political manipulation practices. Direct advertising considered as a means of promoting political messaging based on the most vivid and accessible form possible.

It is determined that political advertising is often included in the system of public relations, which determines its status as part of the influence on the consciousness of citizens. It is proved that political advertising has its own structure, logic and laws of production, which sometimes can not be related to the technological approaches of policy organization. In general, political advertising in the face of political competition is a substitute for authoritarian political propaganda, provided that equal access of political actors to the media market is achieved.

It has been argued that the effectiveness of advertising campaigns is increasingly being questioned both by experts and by voters. Proved that the communication role of political advertising often differs from the political and technological ideas. Direct use of advertising to combat political opponents leads to the reverse effect – distrust of political messages broadcast.

Political and advertising strategies are built primarily on the basis of political goals, and not the commercial principles of advertising. In politico-advertising activity, if the political and technological component is replaced by considerations of preservation of funds or achievement of commercial benefits, the political result is often lost. It is also necessary to take into account the specific needs of advertising media, which are the media.

Political advertising is not an independent sphere of activity and is subject to the general causal consequences of a new chain aimed at achieving the goals and objectives of political actors.

The technological content of political advertising consists in the realization of the goals of one or another political party. In the conditions of constant dynamic changes in the transformational society, the goals of political advertising are not only related to the representation of the image of political forces or personalities. Depending on the changing political situation, political advertising can serve as a means of demonstrating the influence of political force, which sometimes contradicts the actual status of these political structures.

*Key words: political advertising, political technologies, political process, political manipulation, political actor* 

#### UDK 327.8.019.51(470:477)

#### M. Buchyn, Y. Kurus

#### INFORMATION WAR AS AN ELEMENT OF RUSSIAN AGGRESSION AGAINST UKRAINE AT THE MODERN STAGE

The article deals with information warfare as an element of Russian hybrid war against Ukraine. The essence and features of the information war are revealed; historical aspects of Russian aggression against Ukraine in the information sphere are shown. The peculiarities of the Russian information war against Ukraine at the present stage are analyzed. **Keywords:** information war, hybrid war, Russian aggression, Ukraine, Russia.

The modern world is characterized by a new stage of its existence - an information age, which is characterized by the important role of information in the life of not only society but also states on the international arena. In the twenty-first century, information has become a means of influence and confrontation between states, contributing to the emergence and development of phenomena such as information warfare. In our time, the information war has become the main instrument of power that prompts the world to rethink and understand such phenomena as national and international security.

For Ukraine, which became the object of Russian military aggression, the topicality of the study is the fact that the information warfare is part of Russia's hybrid war against Ukraine and is a vivid indication of an increase in the impact of information as weapons in the modern world. The information war has become one of the most difficult issues not only for Ukraine but also for Europe, the United States and the world as a whole. Today's information war can be seen as a very powerful tool that can influence the integrity of states and international security on the world stage. The situation creates new threats not only to the national security of Ukraine, but also to international security in general, and the problem of information warfare requires a systematic study.

The issues of Russian information war against Ukraine are interested in such domestic researchers as S. Velychenko, M. Kasyanenko, E. Magda, L. Pavlyuk, G. Sasin, P. Shevchuk and others [1; 4; 5; 7; 10; 11]. Among the foreign scholars who are studying the problem of information warfare, one should mention J. Darczewska, A. Jacobs, G. Kenneth, M. Kofman, Ch. Lamb, S. Rastorguev, T. Ron, E. Zabrodina and others [3; 8; 12-17]. The aforementioned researchers analyze Russia's information war against Ukraine, study the threats that it carries for both Ukraine and the world community, and investigate the mechanisms of counteracting the Russian information war at the present stage. At the same time, inadequate attention is paid to the study of the essence of the information war in the context of changing the conflictological paradigm at the present stage, the disclosure of the peculiarities and methods of carrying out an information war on the part of Russia against Ukraine. The lack of a comprehensive study of the Russian information war against Ukraine requires more thorough scientific research in this area.

The aim of the work is to carry out a political analysis of the peculiarities of the information war as a component of Russia's aggression against Ukraine at the present stage.

In today's conditions of scientific and technological progress, the development of information technologies and communication tools in socio-humanities, theoretical and methodological changes to the concept of political conflict, its main forms and tools are taking place. The realities of socio-political processes, which are formed objectively, also predetermined the modification of the constituent part of the political conflict, methods, and means used in political confrontations. A new form of modern socio-political conflicts is information threats as an element of pressure and socio-psychological impact on the state and the individual in a political confrontation. The active phase of the confrontation is accompanied by an aggressive information campaign aimed at achieving and maintaining the information advantage of one of the parties to the conflict over the other due to the implementation of specific information-psychological and information-technical influence on the state decision-making system [6].

In the scientific environment, the theoretical conceptualization of this concept is associated with the name of Thomas Ron. He used this term in his report "Weapon Systems and Information Warfare", which was prepared in 1976 for Boeing. By that time, he had aroused interest from the intelligence experts of the US and since the 1980s the term began to appear in the documents of the Ministry of Defense and other similar institutions [17].

To date, scientists have not formed a common opinion regarding the scientific and theoretical concept of information wars, as well as the basic methods, forms and methods of their conduct. It should also be noted that information warfare is an ambiguous concept. Therefore, we can talk about the broad and narrow meaning of this term. In a broad sense, information warfare appears as any negative informational impact on the enemy. This opponent can be any subject: an individual or a group of persons, legal entities or the state. Participants in such wars can act individually or in groups, spontaneously or by agreement. In the narrow sense, information warfare is a new type or method of armed conflict, which is not part of the international legal qualification [16].

In general, the broadest and most comprehensive definition of information warfare is, in our opinion, the following: information warfare is an open or latent purposeful information impact of systems one by one in order to obtain a certain gain in the political, economic or ideological sphere [8, p. 64-66].

Military history has many examples of how information was used in conflicts. For example, this is the Israel-Hezbollah War of 2006, the Russo-Georgian war of 2008, and others. Another war, which continues to this day and is gaining in dissemination, is the Russian information war against Ukraine, which is part of Russia's hybrid war against our state. It includes armed confrontation, information warfare, and psychological warfare.

Ukraine, due to the geopolitical location, has become the subject of political confrontation by the West, the US and Russia, which is the part of the military and political strategy, appears to counter integration policy of Ukraine: 1) in the EU from Russia; 2) with Russia from the side of the countries of the Eastern Europe and the USA [9].

Before turning to the historical aspects of Russia's information war against Ukraine, in our opinion, it is worthwhile to describe the concept of "hybrid war" and its connection with the information warfare. The hybrid approach to military conflicts is based on a combination of various latent and explicit tactics aimed at destabilizing the enemy's functioning. They may include various methods of warfare and cyber attacks to any more traditional military means, acts of terrorism and sabotage, political and economic pressure, psychological operations to other forms of propaganda.

The term "hybrid war" is used to describe a modern approach to defining conflicts as a combination of traditional and non-traditional means of warfare. The main elements of hybrid warfare are regular armed forces, special (military) forces, irregular forces, information warfare, propaganda, diplomacy and economic war. According to the approach of NATO hybrid warfare is a concept that includes the hostilities in which military force is only a fraction of that at once made and which is part of a flexible strategy to achieve long-term goals. Statement by the NATO summit in Wales from September 2014 describes a hybrid war as "a number of militaries, civil, direct or hidden integrated action" [13].

The concept of the hybrid war in Russia was already developed in the second-third decade of the twentieth century. During this period she was called "active intelligence" and "national liberation movement in neighboring countries". At the present stage, Russia's armed conflict with Georgia in 2008 has served as a catalyst for the development and formation of a hybrid approach, but some key elements have already been historically formed, namely:

1) strategically important objects are recorded in operations of attacks;

2) military actions are accompanied by cyber attacks, as well as political and economic measures;

3) there is no declaration of war;

4) the intensity of the conflict remains below the level that could encourage others to intervene in the conflict;

5) escalation is accompanied by a rapid, but orderly derivation of deployed forces, a sort of de-escalation [15].

It should also be noted that this concept was widely discussed in the relations between Russia and Ukraine during the crisis in Ukraine since 2014 (especially as regards the situation with the illegal annexation of the Crimea by Russia). Characteristics that were attributed to the crisis in Ukraine include not only political, economic, military but also key information tools for confrontation.

Against the background of the deployment of the Russian political confrontation against Ukraine, since 2014, the information war is gaining in popularity and prevalence. Before proceeding to a detailed review of the peculiarities and methods of conducting an information war of Russia against Ukraine, one should describe the historical undertones and the origin of this war.

The Russian information war against Ukraine began long before the immediate conflict. More than fifteen years ago, Russia began active anti-Ukrainian propaganda. It consisted in the dissemination of false, incomplete information about events, the status of the Ukrainian state, as well as the manipulation of the consciousness of citizens not only of Ukrainian but also of foreign, propaganda of war, hostility on a national basis [14].

The difference between Russia's information war against Ukraine of those times and today is that this war has moved from the latent type to the open. We argue this, guided by the

fact that most analysts and scholars, when they talk about Russian information warfare, point to its beginning of 2014 and the Revolution of Dignity. However, if we draw attention to the situation, beginning in 1991 after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the proclamation of Ukraine as an independent state, anti-Ukrainian appeals in Russia existed even earlier.

Already in those years, Russia sought to show Ukraine as an ineffective and unnecessary state on the international arena through misinformation and propaganda. As soon as Ukraine was proclaimed independent in 1991, Russia was sharply concerned about Ukraine's nuclear reserves. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, our state inherited a nuclear arsenal, which at that time occupied the third place in the world. Russia has sought in any way to achieve one of its goals: to achieve the return of nuclear weapons to itself or simply to achieve the granting of a non-nuclear state status to Ukraine.

The Russian authorities chose at that time the easiest and least vulnerable means for Russia to achieve the goal - began to actively disseminate information about Ukraine as a state that is not capable of maintaining and serving nuclear weapons. The Russian Federation tried to convince not only its internal audience (the Russian population) but more to the USA, which at that time occupied a leading place on the world stage. In the final result, Russia achieved Ukraine's refusal to use nuclear weapons, which was enshrined in the Declaration on State Sovereignty of Ukraine on July 16, 1990. Already on June 2, 1999, the Ukrainian state officially lost its nuclear status [2].

In our opinion, one should also pay attention to the Russo-Georgian conflict in 2008. During this conflict, Russia has accused Ukraine of violations regarding the supply of arms to Georgia and its desire to invade South Ossetia. According to analysts, this misinformation on the part of the Russian Federation was made in order to represent Ukraine as a state that illegally supports the war in Georgia and directly separatist movements in it. These informational flows of propaganda were unfounded because Georgia is not on the list of countries that are forbidden to provide weapons. However, from the Russian side, the negative information influence on the image of Ukraine on the world stage has already been made [14].

Another example of Russian propaganda as a means of an information war was a range of gas conflicts between Russia and Ukraine that were in 2005-2006, 2008-2009 and 2014-2015. In addition to the economic nature, these conflicts also had an informational dimension. Russia, in any case, tried to strike at the international image of our state due to its informational attacks. Thus, it prevented Ukraine from effectively and openly implementing its foreign policy and improving its relations with other actors in the international arena. Information confrontation in these conflicts took place mainly through the mass media, which disseminated information that Ukraine was a questionable transit gas. As a result, Russia gave reason to European countries to reflect on other ways of the transit of Russian gas.

Many scholars give their chronology of conflicts between Russia and Ukraine, which were conducted with the help of means and methods of information warfare. For example, Ukrainian scientist L. Pavlyuk presents his chronology of Russian-Ukrainian information wars at the beginning of the twenty-first century, dividing it into different types of conflicts with the use of information influence, such as:

► Territorial conflicts: 2003 - conflict over the island of Tuzla; 2006 - Legislative Body of Russia is considering the issue of transferring of the Crimea from Ukraine to Russia.

► Conflicts in geostrategic direction: 2004 - Russian information policy in order to undermine the credibility of presidential candidate V. Yushchenko, who defended the European vector of the foreign policy of Ukraine; from 2008 - the information influence of the Russian Federation, aimed at preventing Ukraine's accession to the EU [1].

Economic conflicts: 2005-2015 - gas conflicts between Russia and Ukraine: Russia's dissemination of information on instability and unreliability of Ukraine as a gas transit; 2009 –

a negative reaction from the Russian side regarding an agreement between Ukraine and the EU in the field of gas infrastructure.

► Conflicts regarding the status of the Russian Black Sea Fleet: 2006 - the deterioration in Russian-Ukrainian relations caused by negotiations on the status of the Black Sea Fleet of Russia [4]; 2008 is the participation of the Black Sea Fleet of Russia in the Russian-Georgian war.

► Conflicts regarding military-political strategies (NATO): 2006 - support for Russian informational sources of protests against Ukraine's accession to NATO on the Crimean peninsula; 2008 is a repeated statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation on the use of all necessary measures to counteract and impede Ukraine's accession to NATO [3].

► Ethnic-language conflicts: Until today, Russia's persistent misinformation about discrimination against Russian-speaking people in Ukraine and the violation of their rights and freedoms [7, p. 218-219].

It's worth noting that Russia's goal in the informational war against Ukraine is not only the desire to destabilize the domestic situation by incitement of the Ukrainian population against the government but also the creation of a negative image of our state on the world stage. Moreover, the realization of these aspirations began not with the Revolution of Dignity in 2014, but from the distant 2005 and the beginning of the Ukrainian-Russian gas conflict. Russia has shown to the whole world that Ukraine is not only a conflict but also a questionable transit gas. Although Ukraine has never questioned or intervened in the transit of gas to Europe through its territory. At the same time, Russia step by step prompted Europe to consider other outlets and ways of the transit of gas from Russia to European countries. The most important point is that all allegations from Russia to Ukraine were not supported by any facts or documents [5].

The modern stage of the Russian information war against Ukraine began with the beginning of the Ukrainian EuroMaidan and continues to this day. It was 2014 that became decisive in Russian-Ukrainian relations when Russia occupied the Crimea. The conflict between Russia and Ukraine, which began in 2014, was considered by many scholars as a typical embodiment of the reality of the recently formulated Russian concept of a hybrid war. The hybrid war is based on operations across a range of power tools that are used by regular and irregular forces. Information operations are an integral part of this multi-faceted strategy of the Russian Federation.

The situation with Ukraine can be considered as the most modern and advanced lessons of conducting information warfare from Russia, which were before also in Estonia (cyber attacks of the Russian Federation on computer systems of state institutions of Estonia in 2007), and in Georgia (Russian-Georgian War in 2008).

Since February 2014, Russia has conducted two separate phases of operations in Ukraine, beginning with the occupation and annexation of the Crimea, and continuing the invasion of Donbas, the industrial region of Eastern Ukraine. The situation with the Crimea began as a veiled military operation that combines ambiguity, misinformation, an element of the unexpected surprise at the operational level with more traditional means of assistance, such as electronic and information warfare. The annexation was completed by the traditional military invasion and occupation of the peninsula [18].

Russia's information activities have played a significant role in all military operations that have taken place in the territory of Eastern Ukraine since 2014. Information activities and influence of the Russian Federation were used at all levels, from the political one (against Ukraine as a state, state structures, political figures), and ending with a tactical aim to justify military unlawful actions initiated by the pro-Russian and Russian forces [12].

Consequently, the Russian information war against Ukraine took place long before the events of 2014. And this is confirmed by many examples of propaganda and misinformation from the side of Russia through various instruments of information warfare. The difference between the information actions of Russia until and after 2014 is that it used to be anti-Ukrainian propaganda, which is now the propaganda of the war. Russia's modern information war against Ukraine has entered a new powerful level with new methods, methods and tools for its management.

The Crimean annexation and the Russian information warfare from 2013 are events that are the consequences of Russian policy aimed at strengthening its own state, restoring the sphere of influence on the international arena, and mobilizing the public that has been preparing since the last century. All the peculiarities, methods, technologies, principles of this war have been diversified with each passing year and a new information age.

In general, Russian propaganda targets three main audiences, namely:

1) Internal audience. Here it means the population of the Russian Federation. It is logical because even in the absence of freedom of speech, the Kremlin is forced to persuade not only the population of Ukraine and the world but also its own internal audience, for the sake of effective information confrontation and blow. The purpose of RF within its state - to achieve loyalty of Russians and make them believe in the images of external enemies.

2) The whole world political audience. To a greater extent, Russia seeks to show the West that Ukraine is incapacitated in the political arena, and also seeks to discredit the Ukrainian Revolution of Dignity and the policy of the new Ukrainian government.

3) The population of Ukraine. Among this target audience, Russia seeks not only to pursue an active disinformation policy but also to spread the negative aspects of the Ukrainian government in order to promote a negative attitude of the Ukrainian people towards it. This propaganda is exposed not only to the ordinary Ukrainian population but also to those people who have a certain influence on public opinion: actors, stars, businessmen, politicians, analysts, journalists, etc. [10].

Russian information attacks against Ukraine are also aimed at propagating the Ukrainian people's views on the federalization of the state as a way out of the current state of internal state, which is caused by hostility not only between the Ukrainian population and its government, but also between the bilingual population of the country - Russian-speaking and Ukrainian-speaking. In this regard, Russia has always actively promoted among the Ukrainian population through various information networks legitimizing the Russian language on the territory of Ukraine as the second state language.

Summarizing the aforementioned, it can be concluded that during the conduct of the information war against Ukraine, the Russian Federation uses such technologies, methods and methods of information confrontation as: promoting the deterioration of the international image of Ukraine on the world stage, as well as promoting the uselessness and disinterestedness of Ukraine as an international actor; misinformation and propaganda for the deterioration of the domestic situation in Ukraine and the promotion of conflicts within the state; propagation of the secularity of Ukrainians and their culture, customs, traditions, language from the time of the Soviet Union and at the same time destroying mentality, feeling of a nation, nationality and nationalistic spirit; propaganda of the Russian language and the simultaneous displacement of the Ukrainian language [11].

Many scholars have been studying the subjects of which Russia conducts an informational war against Ukraine, as well as their effectiveness. One of them is the Ukrainian scientist G. Pevtsov, who believes that state authorities and politicians, ministries, embassies and consulates, think tanks, information agencies and television, mass media, pro-Russian private media, bloggers and others take part in the informational confrontation against Ukraine [9].

As for the media as an instrument of Russian information influence, they are acting as one of the types of the Russian Armed Forces. Russia uses various media channels to conduct its operations against Ukraine, including public and private TV channels (for example, First Channel, Russia-1, NTV, Russia Today), radio (for example, Radio Mayak), Internet sources (in particular including Internet publications such as IA REGNUM, TV Star, Komsomolskaya Pravda, TASS, RIA Novosti) and social networks (for example, Vkontakte, Odnoklasnyky). The main tools of Russian information war against Ukraine, which have the most anti-Ukrainian character are such media channels as Komsomolskaya Pravda and IA REGNUM. It is these mass media, as a rule, who criticize the Ukrainian government and the armed forces, but at the same time do not make a critical assessment of the Russian government. They justify Russian politics in Ukraine and raise the audience of the Ukrainian crisis as a battlefield between Russia and the West (meaning more often the US and NATO and sometimes the EU), which allegedly intends to extend its sphere of influence towards the Russian border.

So, the Russian information warfare is multidimensional and has many features, which can be interpreted differently. Russian information actions are usually situational and flexible; each information and misinformation is given an individual approach, taking into account all its features. That is why the Russian information war and the influence against Ukraine are unpredictable and unexpected. There is no consistent picture that could be used to assess or predict the actions, means, and methods of conducting this information war from the side of Russia. So important is the effective response to information actions from Russia, to develop effective mechanisms to combat Russian information war that could become a perspective direction of our further research.

#### References

1. Величенко С. Російська інформаційна війна проти перспективи членства України в ЄС [Електронний ресурс] / С. Величенко. — Режим доступу : http://vchilka.in.ua/ippopbc/Pociйська+iнформаційна+війна+проти+перспектив и+членства+України+в+єус/main.html ; Velychenko S. Rosiiska informatsiina viina proty perspektyvy chlenstva Ukrainy v YeS [Elektronnyi resurs] / S. Velychenko. — Rezhym dostupu: http://vchilka.in.ua/ippopbc/Pociйська+iнформаційна+війна+проти+перспективи+членств а+України+в+єус/main.html

2. Декларація про державний суверенітет України № 55-12 від 16.07.1990 р. [Електронний ресурс]. – Режим доступу : http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/55-12 ; Deklaratsiia pro derzhavnyi suverenitet Ukrainy № 55-12 vid 16.07.1990 г. [Elektronnyi resurs]. – Rezhym dostupu: http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/55-12

3. Забродина Е. Расширение НАТО за счет Грузии и Украины приведет к катастрофе [Электронный ресурс] / Е. Забродина // Российская Газета. – 2015. – Режим доступа : https://rg.ru/2015/07/28/grushko-site-anons.html ; Zabrodina Ye. Rasshirenie NATO za schet Gruzii i Ukrainy privedet k katastrofe [Elektronnyy resurs] / Ye. Zabrodina // Rossiyskaya Gazeta. – 2015. – Rezhim dostupa : https://rg.ru/2015/07/28/grushko-site-anons.html

4. Касьяненко М. Без провокаторів і русофобів [Електронний ресурс] / М. Касьяненко // День. — 2006. — 19 січня. - Режим доступу : http://day.kyiv.ua/uk/article/podrobici/bez-provokatoriv-i-rusofobiv ; Kasianenko M. Bez provokatoriv i rusofobiv [Elektronnyi resurs] / М. Kasianenko // Den. — 2006. — 19 sichnia. - Rezhym dostupu : http://day.kyiv.ua/uk/article/podrobici/bez-provokatoriv-i-rusofobiv

5. Магда Є. Виклики гібридної війни: інформаційний вимір / Є. Магда // Наукові записки Інституту законодавства Верховної Ради України. – 2014. – №5. – С. 138-142 ; Mahda Ye. Vyklyky hibrydnoi viiny: informatsiinyi vymir / Ye. Mahda // Naukovi zapysky Instytutu zakonodavstva Verkhovnoi Rady Ukrainy. – 2014. – №5. – S. 138-142

6. Модестов С. А. Информационное противоборство как фактор геополитической конкуренции / С. А. Модестов. – Москва : Московский общественный научный фонд : Издательский центр научных и учебных программ, 1999. – 63 с. ; Modestov S. A. Informatsionnoe protivoborstvo kak faktor geopoliticheskoy konkurentsii / S. A. Modestov. – Moskva : Moskovskiy obshchestvennyy nauchnyy fond : Izdatelskiy tsentr nauchnykh i uchebnykh programm, 1999. – 63 s.

7. Павлюк Л. Українсько-російські інформаційні війни: аспекти сценарії, комунікативні стратегії / Л. Павлюк // Вісник Львівського університету. Сер. : Журналістика. - 2012. – Вип. 33. - С. 218–229 ; Pavlyuk L. Ukraïnsko-rosiyski informatsiyni viyni: aspekti stsenariï, komunikativni strategiï / L. Pavlyuk // Visnik Lvivskogo universitetu. Ser. : Zhurnalistika. - 2012. – Vip. 33. - S. 218–229.

8. Расторгуев С. П. Информационная война как целенаправленное информационное воздействие информационных систем / С. П. Расторгуев // Информационное общество. – 1997. - Вып. 1. - С. 64-66 ; Rastorguev S. P. Informatsionnaya voyna kak tselenapravlennoe informatsionnoe vozdeystvie informatsionnykh sistem / S. P. Rastorguev // Informatsionnoe obshchestvo. – 1997. - Vyp. 1. - S. 64-66.

9. Реалізація підходів інформаційної війни Російською Федерацією в сучасному інформаційному просторі України [Електронний ресурс] / Г. В. Пєвцов, С. В. Залкін, С. О. Сідченко та ін. // Наука і техніка Повітряних Сил Збройних Сил України. – 2014. – № 2. – С. 10-13. – Режим доступу: http://nbuv.gov.ua/UJRN/Nitps\_2014\_2\_5 ; Realizatsiia pidkhodiv informatsiinoi viiny Rosiiskoiu Federatsiieiu v suchasnomu informatsiinomu prostori Ukrainy [Elektronnyi resurs] / H. V. Pievtsov, S. V. Zalkin, S. O. Sidchenko ta in. // Nauka i tekhnika Povitrianykh Syl Zbroinykh Syl Ukrainy. – 2014. – № 2. – S. 10-13. – Rezhym dostupu: http://nbuv.gov.ua/UJRN/Nitps\_2014\_2\_5

10. Сасин Г. В. Інформаційна війна: сутність, засоби реалізації, результати та можливості протидії (на прикладі російської експансії в український простір) [Електронний ресурс] / Г. В. Сасин // Грані. – 2015. – №3. – С. 18-23. – Режим доступу: http://nbuv.gov.ua/j-pdf/Grani\_2015\_3\_5.pdf ; Sasyn H. V. Informatsiina viina: sutnist, zasoby realizatsii, rezultaty ta mozhlyvosti protydii (na prykladi rosiiskoi ekspansii v ukrainskyi prostir) [Elektronnyi resurs] / H. V. Sasyn // Hrani. – 2015. – №3. – S. 18-23. – Rezhym dostupu: http://nbuv.gov.ua/j-pdf/Grani\_2015\_3\_5.pdf

11. Шевчук П. Інформаційно-психологічна війна Росії проти України: як їй протидіяти / П. Шевчук // Демократичне врядування. – 2014. – № 13. – С. 8-9; Shevchuk P. Informatsiino-psykholohichna viina Rosii proty Ukrainy: yak yii protydiiaty / P. Shevchuk // Demokratychne vriaduvannia. – 2014. – № 13. – S. 8-9.

12. Cyber War in Perspective: Russian Aggression against Ukraine [Electronic resource]/ ed, by Geers Kenneth. – Tallin: NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence, 2015. – 175 p. – Modeofaccess:

https://ccdcoe.org/sites/default/files/multimedia/pdf/CyberWarinPerspective\_full\_book.pdf

13. Darczewska J. The anatomy of Russian information warfare. The Crimean operation, a case study [Electronic resource] / J. Darszewska // Point of View. – 2014. – № 42. – P. 9-20. – Mode of access : https://www.esw.wew.pl/sites/default/files/the\_anatomy\_of\_russian\_information\_warfare.pdf

https://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/the\_anatomy\_of\_russian\_information\_warfare.pdf
14. Jacobs A. NATO's Hybrid Flanlks: Handling Unconventional Warfare in the South
and the East [Electronic resource] / A. Jacobs, G. Lasconjarias // NATO Defense College. –
2015. – № 112. - Mode of access : https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/190786/rp 112.pdf

15. Kofman M. A Closer look at Russia's "Hybrid War" [Electronic resource] / M. Kofman, M. Rojansky // Wilson Center. – 2015. – № 7. - Mode of

access: https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/7KENNAN%20CABLEROJANSKY%20KOFMAN.pdf

16. Lamb Ch. J. The impact of information age technologies on operations other than war / Ch. J. Lamb // War in the information age: new challenges for U. S. security policy / ed. by R. L. Pfaltzgraff, R. H. Shultz. – Washington D.C. : Brassey's, 1997. – P. 256-268;

17. Rona T. P. Weapon Systems and Information War [Electronic resource] / Th. P. Rona. – Washington : Boeing Aerospace Co., 1976. – 86 p. – Mode of access : http://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/FOID/Reading%20Room/Sc ience\_and\_Technology/09-F-0070-Weapon-Systems-and-Information-War.pdf

18. Russian Information Campaign Against Ukrainian State And Defence Forces [Electronic resource] // NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence. – 2017. – Mode of access : http://stratcomcoe.org/russian-information-campaign-against-ukrainian-state-and-defence-forces

#### UDK 327.7(5-192.2+477)

#### A. Halona

#### INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND ASSOCIATIONS FOR THE PARTICIPATION OF CENTRAL ASIAN COUNTRIES AND UKRAINE

The creation processes and performance of a number of international organizations and associations has been reviewed, namely, the Commonwealth of Independent States, the Customs Union, the Uniform Economic Space, the Eurasian Economic Community, the Eurasian Economic Union, the Collective Security Treaty Organization, the GUUAM, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which are involved Central Asian countries. The opinions of the representatives of the scientific and expert environment concerning multilateral cooperation within the framework of international regional organizations were lighted up from point of view of geopolitical and geo-economic aspects of international relations in the Central Asian region. The analysis of publications devoted to the role and influence of leading world actors has been carried out, in particular the Russian Federation, on the formation of the policy of a number of international organizations. The assessments and comments on the various aspects of international cooperation within the framework of multilateral cooperation with the participation of Central Asian countries have been considered. The views on Ukraine's position have been visioned regarding a number of international regional organizations taking into account the Ukrainian national interests. The author's conclusions about Ukraine's approaches to the integration projects in the post-Soviet space were represented, and also the ways of development of mutually beneficial partnership in the Central Asian direction of foreign policy of Ukraine. The important role of the Central Asian countries in political and economic processes in the post-Soviet space had been emphasized, in particular their positions in international regional organizations and associations.

It is underlined that in today's geopolitical conditions Ukraine should pay due attention to potentially possible interstate relations configurations, trying to be involved in a system of diverse cooperative cooperation with the participation of Kazakhstan, Kipgizstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and a number of key world gamers.

*Key words:* CIS, Customs Union, SES, Eurasian Economic Community, UAE, CSTO, GUUAM, SCO, Central Asia, Central Asian countries, Ukraine, multilateral cooperation.

UDK 32:001.5(477)"16/17"

#### V. Gotsulyak

## UKRAINIAN STATE IDEA IN THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF THE COSSACK ERA

The article examines the content, forms and political implications of Ukrainian statebuilding, which are an actual topic of political science. A special aspect of the reception of the Ukrainian state idea is presented in the political thought of the Cossack era (second half of XVII-XVIII centuries). The creation of the Ukrainian state became the most significant result of the activity of the Ukrainian Cossacks and the most important political consequence of the National Liberation War.

The formation of Ukrainian statehood took place in unison with the processes of awakening national identity, the growth of national identity, the development of Ukrainian culture. Despite the fact that the formation of the institutional foundations of Ukrainian state formation was a complicated, controversial, far from its completion, process, in many respects not similar to that which took place in European societies, there is no reason to doubt the existence of the Ukrainian state, nor that she fulfilled all the functions inherent in this social institute.

The Ukrainian Cossacks were a force that sought to realize the political and state ideals of the Ukrainian ethnic group. Cossacks had a decisive influence on the emergence in the Ukrainian society of new models of world perception and a new political culture. Thanks to the Cossacks, the process of consolidation of the Ukrainian people around the national idea became possible, which was in the middle of the XVII century. was identified with the idea of Ukrainian statehood.

Thus, in spite of various transformations, contradictory contradictions in the sociopolitical life of early modern Ukraine, the state idea was dominant in the political thought of the Cossack era. Ukrainian Cossacks emerged in the political thought of the second half of the XVII-XVIII centuries. the main state-building force, the representative of the entire Russian people, the defender of his rights and interests, the bearer of the idea of Ukrainian statehood.

*Key words: state creation, Cossacks, national idea, political culture, autonomy, early modern Ukraine.* 

#### UDK 314.151.3

#### O. Demydenko

#### THE NATURE OF INTELLECTUAL MIGRATION: DEFINITION OF THE TERM AND CONCEPTUAL APPROACHES TO ITS CHARACTERISTICS

The article deals with the core definition of the concept of «intellectual migration», which characterizes one of the most urgent aspects of the migration movement in the modern international space. The positions of different experts to the terminology that characterizes these processes are studied. The conceptual approaches to the characterization of the processes of intellectual migration from the point of view of influence on the donor countries and the recipient states, which are involved in the migration movement, are explored.

The phenomenon of intellectual migration in the scientific environment is recognized as a multifaceted and influential element of the international system. Among the various aspects of migration forms this kind of movement of citizens, to a large extent, affects the redistribution of force and potential in the global space, between different regions and states. Some researchers focus on the scientific nature of intellectual migration. However, there is a more widespread view that these processes concern the entire spectrum of interstate movement of persons involved in the creative and intellectual work. The reasons for implementing the migration movement of these categories of citizens in general correspond to the general concept of labor migration, which is usually caused by the search for better living conditions and professional self-realization abroad. At the same time, different dimensions of the studied problem have different connotations and importance for the involved actors. In modern conditions of globalization, the processes of reverse and temporary intellectual migration (in the format of experience exchange, participation in grant activities) are an indispensable condition for the inclusion of the state in the world scientific environment. It becomes an important element of increasing the country's potential for intensive development on the international space. At the same time, the irreversible emigration of the intellectual elite is becoming a leading security threat to states that are losing their intellectual potential. The fact that Ukraine also directly suffers from this phenomenon determines the relevance of the study of migration problems for national science, creating the request for theoretical and practical studies from the authorities.

*Key words: intellectual migration, intellectual capital, «brain mobility», «brain drain», scientific community, external migration, exchange of experience* 

#### UDK 321.015(477)

#### K. Zabavska

## THE MAIN APPROACHES TO THE INTERPRETATION OF THE SYSTEM OF CHECKS AND BALANCES IN UKRAINIAN POLITICAL SCIENCE

The article deals with the peculiarities of the main approaches to the theoretical substantiation of the system of checks and balances in the political science of Ukraine. The main historical stages of the development of domestic researchers ideas about the functioning of the checks and balances system are outlined and, on their basis, typical problems in the study of this political phenomenon through the prism of Ukrainian state-building practice are analyzed.

**Keywords:** separation of powers, system, checks, balances, political science, Ukraine, democracy.

A clear distinction between the powers of the branches of state power is an important prerequisite for building a democratic society. The political experience of Western democracies proves that effective separation of powers of the branches of power is a guarantee of democratic development and ensuring the constitutional order in the state. The features of the mutual restraints system presuppose the application of an integrated approach, which goes beyond purely system analysis of the distribution of power. Being a multi-faceted, labile and multidimensional phenomenon, the system of checks and balances becomes a complex and multifaceted subject of political analysis. Throughout history, the existence of certain pragmatic knowledge regarding the separation of powers and individual practical skills in the division of

powers in the political practice of the states of the world gradually changed, and in our time there is a need for a deep theoretical elaboration of accumulated knowledge about the system. Modern political science is increasingly focusing attention on issues related to the delineation of authority and the solution of problems relating to mutual competences between the poles of power.

The intensification of interest in such problems is determined by the globalization processes taking place in the contemporary international arena, the scientists predicted the «wave of democracy outflow» and the growth of authoritarian tendencies in the world. The fact of the erosion of state sovereignty and the internal transformations of post-socialist countries including the obstacles that are on this path are also not overlooked. Ukraine is no exception in this regard.

At the current stage of development of Ukrainian statehood, the study of the checks and balances system is particularly important. The transitional character of the political regime, the imperfection of modern Ukrainian legislation, the short time of functioning of the checks and balances system since the independence of Ukraine, as well as some national peculiarities, have led to an intensification of the scientific search for Ukrainian researchers in this field.

In the historical retrospect, the issues of the distribution of power and authority among its branches were researched by M. Drahomanov V. Lypynskyi S. Orikhovskyi and others [6; 7; 8]. Such domestic scholars as N. Haidayenko, I. Kresina, V. Rebkalo, L. Sylenko, M. Tsvik, V. Shapoval and others are actively searching for ways of theoretical substantiation of the system of checks and balances in Ukraine [2; 15; 13; 14; 18]. Among the Ukrainian scholars, representatives of the sciences adjacent to the political science who are actively involved in the study of the problems of the checks and balances system N. Zhuk, M. Onishchuk, I. Protsyuk, V. Surnin, Y. Shamshchychenko, and others should be mentioned. [3; 4; 9; 11; 16] At the same time, in modern Ukrainian political thought, there is not a single approach to the study of the system of checks and balances and there are no principles of theoretical and methodological analysis for the study of the fundamentals of the system functioning.

*The purpose of the article* is to analyze the main approaches to the interpretation of the checks and balances system in Ukrainian political science.

Problems of distribution of powers are directly related to the development of statebuilding practice in Ukraine. Therefore, in our opinion, it is worth highlighting the following stages in the development of ideas about the separation of the poles of power and the relationship between them in the history of Ukrainian political thought:

The I stage  $(IX - XII \ centuries)$  – the period of ideas about the functioning of the state administration apparatus, associated with the emergence of statehood on Ukrainian lands. In this period, the main provisions of socio-political thought, depicted in the chronicles, are singled out. In the pure form, the problem of delimitation has not yet risen, however, at this stage the problems of the current nature, the legal regulation of social relations, the relationship between the church and the state, the problem of the integrity and sovereignty of political power were reviewed [5, p. 16-22].

*The II stage (XVI – beginning of the XVII century).* For this period, the ideological and political movement for the liberation of the Ukrainian people against the Polish magnates was in priority. Among the philosophers of this period S. Orikhovskyi is worth mentioning. In particular, the enlightened monarchy limited by law was an ideal for S. Orichovskyi. He opposed the theological theory of the divine basis of state and power, considered unacceptable subordination of secular power to the spiritual. The philosopher made an attempt to delimit their powers: the bishop during the service is not subject to the king; the power of the king does not apply to the church; the sphere of influence of the bishop is limited to the walls of the cathedral [7, p. 174].

*The III stage (second half of the XVII – the end of the XVIII century) –* Ukrainian political thought of the Cossack-Hetman period. The first document in the history, which stated the separate elements of the system of checks and balances was the «Pact and Constitution, laws and liberties Zaporizhia Army» that was the agreement between Hetman P. Orlyk and officers of the Zaporizhzhya Cossacks and in 1710. The main provisions of the Constitution of P. Orlik generally depict a parliamentary republic. In the 16 articles document describes the basic powers of the three branches of government (legislative, represented by the General Council, the executive led by Hetman and general officers, judicial implemented through the activities of the military court) with elements of mutual checks. The Constitution presupposes the mutual accountability: Hetman had to report to the General Council, and the latter, in turn, should report on public affairs. In addition, the General Council had the power to express the nobility to the Hetman and, on his submission, approved the staff of the General Officer. The text of the Constitution is permeated with the main idea of limiting hetman power by other branches, and the principle of the independence of judges was also highlighted [10].

*The IV stage (XIX – beginning of XX centuries).* An outstanding figure in the Ukrainian political thought of the middle of the XIX century was M. Drahomanov. In his state-legal concept, the thinker distinguished three branches of power: legislative, executive and judicial. Expected elements of the system of checks and balances were envisaged, namely: the legislative power belonged to two thoughts - the state and the union; amendments to the basic laws were to be made in the case of the consent of a third of the votes of members of the two dumas and approved by the State Council elected from the two dumas, as well as by delegates from the regional assembly; the head of state appointed ministers responsible to both the [6, p. 56-60].

At the beginning of the XXI century V. Lypynskyi paid attention to the issue of the delineation of power and the relationship between them. Thinker advocated the establishment of a legal monarchy in the traditional form of the Hetmanate. It provided for the restriction of the power of the head of state by two chambers of law: the lower – the Congress of Soviets of individual lands, representing the interests of the territories, the highest – the Labor Council, the state – represents the interests of labor. In his concept, V. Lypynskyi stressed that such a division of powers would prevent the establishment of centralization like Moscow terror and the Polish monarchy, where the king is a puppet in the hands of the gentry [8].

*The V stage (1919-1991)* – the Soviet period in Ukrainian political thought. This stage of the development of political ideas in Ukraine was accompanied by inhibition of theoretical substantiation and practical implementation of the mechanisms of the system of checks and balances. At this stage, the principle of the division of power was preserved only formally. Formally, the highest legislative body of the Ukrainian soviet republic from 1920 to July 1938 was the All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets, and from July 1938 – the Verkhovna Rada of the Ukrainian SSR. However, in fact, since the establishment of Soviet power in Ukraine until the restructuring, power was in the hands of the Communist Party (CP) of Ukraine within the Communist Party of Soviet Union. The Central Committee was the supreme body of the Communist Party, and the Secretary General of the Central Committee of the CP of Ukraine was the leader of the state. All candidates for the Verkhovna Rada deputies were subject to compulsory approval by the leadership of the Communist Party, the nomination of alternative candidates was not allowed. The system of checks and balances was functioning in the state apparatus without alternatives [5, p. 292-311].

The VI stage (from 1991 - modern times) – Is connected with the Ukraine's independence gaining. At this stage, the development of the theory of the system of checks and balances has been activated and becomes a necessary guarantee for the building the young Ukrainian democracy. A characteristic feature of this stage is the diffusion of the practical implementation of state power in the theoretical positions regarding the functioning of the system of checks and

balances. The need to search for an optimal power distribution system between the poles is one of the main obstacles on the path to independent development of Ukraine. Lack of theoretical developments in this field causes a number of problems in the practical implementation of the power branches authorities.

Scientists of this period share practically the only ideas in the view of the deistribution of power and the functioning of the system of checks and balances. In particular, M. Tsvick emphasized that among the basic requirements for the distribution of power in a democratic state is the independence and separation of the branches of power according to the functional capabilities, a clear separation of political and legal forms of activity, mutual influence, balance and control between them [18].

According to the Ukrainian scientist Y. Shemchushenko, the problems of optimizing the state system in Ukraine, improving the activities and interaction of the legislative, executive and judicial authorities, as well as the problem of systematic development of Ukrainian legislation, are crucial for building a democratic society [3, p. 207].

Among the main problems of contemporary political science in Ukraine related to the study of the checks and balances system as a special phenomenon of a democratic society should be called:

The problem of the correlation of legal and political aspects in the functioning of the system of checks and balances. It should be noted that, for the most part, the system of checks and balances is considered through the prism of legal science. However, over the past decade, the political component of the system has gradually come to the fore in the studies of Ukrainian political scientists. This also includes the problem of choosing the directions and methods of studying the system of checks and balances. According to the Ukrainian researcher N. Haidayenko, the question of choosing a research methodology is key because it is necessary to distinguish political knowledge about the system [2].

The problem of a comprehensive study of the system of checks and balances. There is an important problem in the modern political study – the construction of a modern theory of a system of checks and balances with the modernization of existing theoretical positions and taking into account the multilateral nature of the origin of the division of powers and mutual restraint. The need to elucidate practical advice for political activity necessitates an integrated approach to studying the problems of the system of checks and balances, using a wide array of methods. In particular, according to the law scientist N. Zhuk, the system of checks and balances is a multidimensional and multifunctional entity, which is itself the basis for self-regulation of state power. In addition, the scientist substantiates the thesis of multidimensionality and multivariation of the checks and balances system nature [9; 12; 14].

The problem of accumulation of empirical and theoretical knowledge regarding the functioning of the system of checks and balances. Given the peculiarities of the nature of the origin of power and its distribution, the accumulation of facts and the possibility of their processing are often problematic. The interpretation and processing of facts and the avoidance of subjective judgments and evaluations is equally important. The search and study of the principles, patterns and functions of the system of checks and balances are aimed primarily at the development of practical recommendations for political practice. However, the complex connections of the theory of the system of checks and balances with practice are limited by the limited arsenal of methods used in its study.

In particular, scholars V. Rebkalo and V. Shakhov emphasize the key theoretical problem of contemporary political science in Ukraine is the problem that there is no adequate coverage in the domestic literature of creating a system of checks and balances in the process of implementing the principle of the distribution of power[15, p. 15].

Polarity of the results of qualitative assessment of the checks and balances system. The problem in the processing of empirical data concerning the functioning of the system of checks

and balances is the possibility not only to describe the observed phenomena, but also to explain them, to distinguish the characteristic features and to find the causal relationships.

In our opinion, the system of checks and balances, namely, the relationship between its key elements can be subjected to quantitative analysis methods. The use of alternative methods of research can create the conditions for the possibility of obtaining more objective knowledge about the system of checks and balances. This problem is an urgent field for future researches in this direction.

The problem of the correlation between theoretically substantiated provisions of the system of checks and balances and the practical implementation by the subjects of the policy of authority, taking into account the peculiarities of the political system of the state, actual needs and moods in society, as well as the presence or absence of personal interests of the parties. The theoretical developments of the future comprehensive theory of checks and balances should harmoniously lie in the practical sphere of implementation by the parties of the policy of their powers within the system, but the emergence of an imbalance may be inevitable without taking into account latent factors: from national peculiarities to the current balance of power in the political arena of the state [1; 4].

It should be noted that the complexity of this problem is observed in the adoption of constitutionally important decisions. Often, changes related to the optimization of the system of checks and balances in order to improve its functioning are carried out exclusively politically. Therefore, the taken decisions are not practical and expedient, but are politically beneficial for those who accept them in particular period of time.

Despite the current intensification of attention to the problems of separation of powers in Ukraine, finding the optimal system of checks and balances, it should be mentioned that the updating of the importance of checks and balances takes place on a peak of a conflict related to the inability of the system to the harmonious functioning. Most often, this is due to the imperfection of the domestic legislation and the availability of gaps that serve as favorable area for the emergence of speculation and political maneuvering.

The study of the system of checks and balances can not be detached from political practice. Therefore, according to N. Haidayenko for transferring logical practical developments in theoretical principles a comparative and institutional approaches should be applied and the study should not be limited only by the system aproach [2].

According to I. Protsyuk, the division of powers contains an institutional and functional component. The institutional aspect implies the existence of three branches of government, at the same time functional – is basic for their interactions relative independence and mutual dependence [11, P.5] The system of checks and balances is responsible precisely for the functional content of the separation of powers. However, its study can not be isolated from the institutional component.

The following areas of the checks and balances system research in contemporary Ukrainian political science can be singled out:

Study of checks and balances as a mechanism of legally binding authority powers (jurisprudence approach) (N. Zhuk, I. Protsiuk, L. Sylenko, A. Yakovlev and others.). Political science is fully in line with the requirements of post-classical (modern) science. According to this, researchers should be aware that its object is complex integral formation, labile, and yet multifaceted. The emergence of new theoretical developments in the distribution of power within different approaches, as well as the interpenetration of methods from various sciences can be an evidence of it. In Ukraine, in particular, the most deeply the system of checks and balances is studied in the field of legal science [3; 4; 11; 13].

The direction of the study of functional imbalances in the system of checks and balances between the branches of power in Ukraine (O. Valewskyi, M. Onishchuk, I. Salo and others).

Many modern scholars and public figures focus their attention on the problems of functional filling of the system of checks and balances, as well as the practical implementation of the branches of power of their authorities. Political experience of Ukraine testifies the need to reform the provisions regarding the functions of the branches of power, as well as the harmonization of national legislation to prevent the emergence of contradictions in the interaction between the power branches [1; 9; 12; 14].

Study of the system of checks and balances as a political phenomenon, the attribute of democracy (N. Haidanenko, V. Rebkalo, V. Shakhov and others). Representatives of this trend focus their research on the political nature of the phenomenon of checks and balances, considering it as one of the conditions for building a democratic society [2; 15; 17].

However, it should be added that the division into such approaches, given the specifics of the object being studied, is rather arbitrary. In our opinion, the study of the system of checks and balances in a single key is unjustified. The interdisciplinary character of the phenomenon of the system of checks and balances determines the consideration of knowledge and theoretical developments in legal science, philosophy and sociology.

To sum up, the following key points should be emphasized. The system of checks and balances is an important attribute of democratic development. Being a multivariate phenomenon, which is an interdisciplinary object of research, the problems of functioning of the system and the laws of its development find their place in the historical development of political thought and political practice at the same time. The study of the role and place of the system of checks and balances in building a democratic society in modern Ukraine is of particular importance. It is worth noting that, at the current stage of development of political thought, the theoretical substantiation of the system of checks and balances requires a deeper analysis and accumulation of new theoretical knowledge. The study of this phenomenon, taking into account the integrated approach and using methods of qualitative and quantitative assessment deserves particular attention. The question of accumulation of theoretical knowledge, approbation of new research methods and the application of different approaches to the study of mutual restraints and balances remain open and may constitute perspective directions for our further research.

#### References

1. Валевський О. Л. Проблеми побудови дієвого механізму стримувань і противаг у державно-управлінських відносинах [Електронний ресурс] / О. Л. Валевський // Державне управління: теорія і практика. – 2008. – № 1. – Режим доступу : http://academy.gov.ua/ej/ej7/doc\_pdf/valevsky.pdf\_; Valevskyi O. L. Problemy pobudovy diievoho mekhanizmu strymuvan i protyvah u derzhavno-upravlinskykh vidnosynakh [Elektronnyi resurs] / O. L. Valevskyi // Derzhavne upravlinnia: teoriia i praktyka. – 2008. – № 1. – Rezhym dostupu : http://academy.gov.ua/ej/ej7/doc\_pdf/valevsky.pdf

2. Гайдаєнко Н. В. Проблеми наукового дослідження системи стримувань і противаг в сучасній політичній теорії / Н. В. Гайдаєнко // Сучасна українська політика. Політики і політологи про неї. – Київ, 2005. – Вип. 7. – С. 152-158 ; Haidaienko N. V. Problemy naukovoho doslidzhennia systemy strymuvan i protyvah v suchasnii politychnii teorii / N. V. Haidaienko // Suchasna ukrainska polityka. Polityky i politolohy pro nei. – Kyiv, 2005. – Vyp. 7. – S. 152-158.

3. Державотворення і правотворення в Україні: досвід, проблеми, перспективи : моногр. / за ред. Ю. С. Шемшученка. – Київ : Ін-т держави і права ім. В.М. Корецького, 2001. – 656 с. ; Derzhavotvorennia i pravotvorennia v Ukraini: dosvid, problemy, perspektyvy : monohr. / za red. Yu. S. Shemshuchenka. – Kyiv : In-t derzhavy i prava im. V.M. Koretskoho, 2001. – 656 s.

4. Жук Н. А. Система стримувань і противаг у державному апараті: витоки та основний зміст / Н. А. Жук // Вісник Академії правових наук України. – 2003. - № 4. – С. 52-62 ; Zhuk N. A. Systema strymuvan i protyvah u derzhavnomu aparati: vytoky ta osnovnyi zmist / N. A. Zhuk // Visnyk Akademii pravovykh nauk Ukrainy. – 2003. - № 4. – S. 52-62.

5. Історія політичної думки України : підруч. / за заг. ред. Н. М. Хоми. – Львів : Новий Світ-2000, 2017. – 632 с. ; Istoriia politychnoi dumky Ukrainy : pidruch. / za zah. red. N. M. Khomy. – Lviv : Novyi Svit-2000, 2017. – 632 s.

6. Круглашов А. М. Драма інтелектуала: політичні ідеї Михайла Драгоманова / А. М. Круглашов. – Чернівці : Прут, 2000. – 488 с. ; Kruhlashov A. M. Drama intelektuala: politychni idei Mykhaila Drahomanova / A. M. Kruhlashov. – Chernivtsi : Prut, 2000. – 488 s.

7. Куташев I. В. Суспільно-політичні погляди С. Оріховського / І. В. Куташев // Політичний менеджмент. - 2005. –№ 3. - С. 169-179 ; Kutashev I. V. Suspilno-politychni pohliady S. Orikhovskoho / I. V. Kutashev // Politychnyi menedzhment. - 2005. –№ 3. - S. 169-179

8. Липинський В. К. «Нова Зоря» і ідеологія гетьманців [Електронний ресурс] / В.К. Липинський. — Режим доступу : http://chtyvo.org.ua/authors/ Lypynskyi\_Viacheslav/Nova\_Zoria\_i\_ideolohiia\_hetmantsiv/; Lypynskyi V. K. «Nova Zoria» i ideolohiia hetmantsiv [Elektronnyi resurs] / V. K. Lypynskyi. — Rezhym dostupu : http://chtyvo.org.ua/authors/Lypynskyi\_Viacheslav/Nova\_Zoria\_i\_ideolohiia\_hetmantsiv/

9. Оніщук М. В. Система стримувань і противаг в українській моделі організації влади: проблеми і шляхи вдосконалення / М. В. Оніщук // Часопис Київського університету права. – 2012. –  $\mathbb{N}_{2}$  3. – С. 91-95 ; Onishchuk M. V. Systema strymuvan i protyvah v ukrainskii modeli orhanizatsii vlady: problemy i shliakhy vdoskonalennia / M.V. Onishchuk // Chasopys Kyivskoho universytetu prava. – 2012. –  $\mathbb{N}_{2}$  3. – S. 91-95.

10. Пакти і конституції законів і вольностей Війська Запорозького 1710 [Електронний ресурс]. - Режим доступу : http://www.gska2.rada.gov.ua/ site/const/istoriya/1710.html ; Pakty i konstytutsii zakoniv i volnostei Viiska Zaporozkoho [Elektronnyi resurs]. – Rezhym dostupu : http://www.hist ory.org.ua/?termin=Pakty\_i\_Konstytutsiia\_prav\_i\_volnostej\_Vijska\_Zaporozkoho\_1710

11. Процюк I. В. Система стримувань і противаг у функціонуванні механізму державної влади парламентської держави / І. В. Процюк // Державне будівництво та місцеве самоврядування. – 2015. – Вип. 29. – С. 3-17 ; Protsiuk I. V. Systema strymuvan i protyvah u funktsionuvanni mekhanizmu derzhavnoi vlady parlamentskoi derzhavy / I.V. Protsiuk // Derzhavne budivnytstvo ta mistseve samovriaduvannia. – 2015. – Vyp. 29. – S. 3-17.

12. Сало І. С. Механізми стримувань і противаг у політичних системах країн ЄС та в Україні / І. С. Сало // Стратегічні пріоритети. - 2009. - № 2. – С. 65-70 ; Salo I. S. Mekhanizmy strymuvan i protyvah u politychnykh systemakh krain YeS ta v Ukraini / I. S. Salo // Stratehichni priorytety. - 2009. - № 2. – S. 65-70.

13. Силенко Л. М. Система стримувань і противаг: теоретичні аспекти / Л. М. Силенко // Вісник Запорізького юридичного інституту. – 1999. – Вип. 4. – С. 89-97 ; Sylenko L. M. Systema strymuvan i protyvah: teoretychni aspekty / L. M. Sylenko // Visnyk Zaporizkoho yurydychnoho instytutu. – 1999. – Vyp. 4. – S. 89-97.

14. Силенко Л. М. Система «стримань і противаг» та закріплення її складових в Конституції України / Л. М. Силенко // Науковий вісник Національної академії внутрішніх справ України. – 1998. – № 3. – С. 37-39 ; Sylenko L. M. Systema «stryman i protyvah» ta zakriplennia yii skladovykh v Konstytutsii Ukrainy / L. M. Sylenko // Naukovyi visnyk Natsionalnoi akademii vnutrishnikh sprav Ukrainy. – 1998. – № 3. – S. 37-39.

15. Система стримувань і противаг у сфері державно-управлінських відносин : наук.-метод. рек. / за заг.ред. В. А. Ребкала, М. М. Логунової, В. А. Шахова. – Київ : НАДУ, 2008. – 72 с. ; Systema strymuvan i protyvah u sferi derzhavno-upravlinskykh vidnosyn : nauk.-metod. rek. / za zah.red. V. A. Rebkala, M. M. Lohunovoi, V. A. Shakhova. – Kyiv : NADU, 2008. – 72 s.

16. Сурнін В. О. Принцип розподілу гілок влади як основа для створення дієвої системи стримувань і противаг / В. О. Сурнін // Теорія і практика державного управління. – 2014. – Вип. 2. – С. 75-82 ; Surnin V. O. Pryntsyp rozpodilu hilok vlady yak osnova dlia stvorennia diievoi systemy strymuvan i protyvah / V. O. Surnin // Teoriia i praktyka derzhavnoho upravlinnia. – 2014. – Vyp. 2. – S. 75-82.

17. Сурнін В. О. Механізми стримувань та противаг у системі розподілу влади / В. О. Сурнін // Актуальні проблеми державного управління, педагогіки та психології. – 2013. – Вип. 2. – С. 140-144 ; Surnin V. O. Mekhanizmy strymuvan ta protyvah u systemi rozpodilu vlady / V. O. Surnin // Aktualni problemy derzhavnoho upravlinnia, pedahohiky ta psykholohii. – 2013. – Vyp. 2. – S. 140-144 ;.

18. Цвик М. В. Актуальные проблемы организации власти в Украине / М. В. Цвик // Проблемы законности : респ. междувед. науч. сб., 1995. – Вып. 30. – С. 22–30 ; Tsvik M. V. Aktualnye problemy organizatsii vlasti v Ukraine / M. V. Tsvik // Problemy zakonnosti : resp. mezhduved. nauch. sb., 1995. – Vyp. 30. – S. 22–30.

19. Яковлев А. Н. Принцип разделения государственной власти и его обеспечение в конституционном процессе современной Украины / А. Н. Яковлев // Legea si Viata. – 2016. – Вип.11/2. – С. 164-168 ; Yakovlev A. N. Printsip razdeleniya gosudarstvennoy vlasti i ego obespechenie v konstitutsionnom protsesse sovremennoy Ukrainy / A. N. Yakovlev // Legea si Viata. – 2016. – Vip.11/2. – S. 164-168.

#### UDK 327(510):061.15PIKC

#### V. Zabiian

#### SPECIFICS OF THE SYSTEM APPROACH APPLICATION IN POLITICAL SCIENCE (ON EXAMPLE OF CHINA'S MEMBERSHIP IN BRICS)

In the article author describes the specifics of the system approach application in political science. Discovering the history of the system approach through the works of foreign and domestic scientists, it has been found out that it is becoming multidisciplinary way to explain things today. The core of the system approach is logical system analysis, that can be used without quantitive methods in order to model the investigated phenomenon and discover it's principles, mechanisms, elements, functions, goals etc. Following the principles of logical system analysis, it is possible to give characteristics to difficult, multileveled phenomenons, creating an abstract model of it.

Author gives definitions of political system and system of international relations according to system approach creating theoretical basis for practice. Such phenomenon as China's membership in BRICS is a part of complicated system of international relations which contains many elements, some of which are systems as well. Taking into account communication aspect of system approach, it has beed p figured out that China's membership in BRICS is the connection between BRICS (as element of international relations system and system itself) and China (as element of international relations system), which is expressed in documents signed between China and BRICS's members and which has an impact on China's political system. Under this impact, Chinese political system produces decisions that get to the outside environment creating challenges for Chinese political system, BRICS system and system of international relations. As a result, all the systems tend to be saved and accept changes experiencing transformations.

Practical example of system approach application, which is given in the article, can be useful for further researches in political science. Especially in discovering specifics of international relations system, international organizations, actions of political actors on international arena and influence of international relations on decision making process within the state's political system.

*Keywords:* system approach, system analysis, system of international relations, China, BRICS.

UDK 327(4-5)

O. Zvezdova

#### POTENTIAL VARIANTS OF THE CONFLICTS DEVELOPMENT AROUND DE FACTO STATES IN THE POST-SOVIET SPACE

This article deals with the main scholars approaches to ways of conflicts settlement around de facto states in the post-Soviet space. The author makes an attempt to predict the response of the world community to the potential variants of the problem and to determine the probability of four possible scenarios for separatist regions of the post-Soviet space.

The author proposes to focus on the following options: reintegration into the mother country; inclusion of the territory of a de facto state into another state; achieving international recognition as an independent state; status quo preservation. All these scenarios are possible with varying degrees of probability, but are also not mutually exclusive, that is, they can consistently change each other in the process of historical development. The probability of a scenario depends on: the general political climate in the international arena, the position of the world's leading players, the political and economic situation in the mother country, the power of the patron-state.

The author considers as the most likely preservation of the status quo, which can be observed since the mid-1990s. The least probable is the association of de facto states with the patron-state. The Russian Federation has no sufficient economic base and international support for such absorption at the present time. And partial recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia changed their legal status, but deprived of de facto sovereignty.

The author assures that the scenario of full reintegration into the mother country is most likely for the new separatist entities on the Ukrainian territory. So-called "LNR" and "DNR" authorities failed to build any effective state mechanisms or get support from world powers. Therefore, the main task of the Ukrainian authorities is to prevent the freezing of the conflict at the present stage. The author assume that full reintegration of the separatist territories in the East of Ukraine to the mother country is possible in the event of preventing the freezing of the conflict.

Key words: de facto states, Abkhazia, Nagorny Karabakh, South Ossetia, Transnistria

UDK 327.8.019.51

#### P. Katerynchuk

#### CHALLENGES AND THREATS OF UKRAINE'S NATIONAL CYBER SECURITY IN HYBRID WAR

Cyber space of Ukraine for a long time remained out of attention of domestic researchers and, therefore, state officials. For more than 20 years, the young Ukrainian state did not waste its efforts on the formation of not only effective and reliable troops, but also information security. The government did not endeavoured to strengthen the country's defence, and only weakened its lack of progress in fighting corruption and the dominance of Russian media and intelligence. As a result, in the spring of 2014, after a long confrontation between the regime of Viktor Yanukovych and the citizens of Ukraine, Russia failed to conduct special operations with the aim of annexing the Crimea and facilitate the war in Donbas. Not the least role in this played a raid for information and factors cyber Russian hackers for the purpose of paralysing government agencies and influence on public opinion in Ukraine through Russian-controlled media.

As a result of prolonged and massive cyberattacks, Ukrainian state structures, the banking system, industrial facilities and private business suffered significant material and reputational losses. At the same time in Ukraine began to realize the seriousness of cyber security as a component of national security and contribute to creating cyber police, national cybersecurity strategy, acceptance of a number of regulations on cyber security, strengthening public defense for the protection of domestic cyber space. At the moment, Ukraine is on the way to rethinking the role of cyber security and the formation of a national system of protection against cyber threats.

Key words: cyberspace, cybersecurity, hacker attacks, information security.

Introduction. The hybrid war in the East of Ukraine and the information confrontation with Russia as a state that systematically uses the media space and the Internet to achieve its political goals, necessitates the study of the issue of protecting the cyberspace of Ukraine as an integral part of the state's information security. For the first time, Russian cyber threats and possible cyber attacks began to speak during the 2016 US election campaign, when, according to many researchers, the intervention of Russian hackers and the hacking of the electronic mailbox of the Democratic Party, Hillary Clinton, influenced the electoral campaign and electoral sympathies of Americans. However, these were only echoes of a long and purposeful campaign of Russian intelligence services, which increasingly involve cyberspace and electronic media of mass communication for espionage and undermining the interests of the Kremlin. At the same time, hacker attacks on government structures and industrial facilities occurred earlier, and not only within the same continent.

Analysis of recent research and publications. The study of the security of cyberspace as a component of information security has become the subject of scientific research by foreign and Ukrainian scientists, in particular D. Dubov, A. Gor, M. Ozhevan, V. Butuzova, C. Borys, E. Nakashima, P. Polityuk etc.

However, despite a fairly large number of studies and publications on the topic of information and cyber security, their analysis shows that researchers have considered only general issues of developing a national system of cybernetic security as an integral element of the information security system.

Therefore, the aim of this article is to study the protection of the cyberspace as a component of Ukraine's information security.

Presentation of the main research material. The United States reacted to Russia's hacking attacks by introducing new sanctions against companies and individuals that prohibited any operations within the US financial system. In addition, sanctions prohibit American companies and citizens from having business related to companies and sanctioned individuals. Persons included in the sanction list - Alexander Tribun, Oleg Chirikov and Volodymyr Kagansky - are believed to have a relationship with «Divetechnoservis», a company specializing in hacking attacks on underwater communications systems [23]. Among the examples of «malicious and destabilizing activity» of the US Department of the Treasury calls the NotPetya virus and an attack on power distribution networks. In February 2018, the White House said that the damage caused by the NotPetya virus in Europe, Asia, and America was calculated in billions of dollars. The NotPetya attack in the White House was named part of the Kremlin's efforts to destabilize the situation in Ukraine, which is increasingly demonstrating Russia's participation in the ongoing conflict [21].

Russia denies involvement in the attack and indicates that Russian companies have also suffered from it. However, the British ministers also said that Russian cyberattacks are NotPetya [22]. The British Foreign Ministry says: «The cyberattack looked like extortion, but the true purpose of the virus was not to get a ransom, but to break the work of the Ukrainian state institutions, the financial and energy sectors of the economy». On the first day of the spread of the virus, June 27, it struck 2,000 organizations, 75% of the victims fell to Ukraine. Ukrainian ministries, police, banks, Boryspil airport, Kyiv metro, media, mobile operators, medical companies have suffered. The virus blocked computers and demanded money in exchange for restoring access to locked programs. British prime minister Theresa May has blamed President Putin in November last year for trying to «sow discord» in the west - through interference in elections, dissemination of misinformation and cyberwar.

Theresa May has accused Russia of meddling in elections and planting fake stories in the media in an extraordinary attack on its attempts to «weaponise information» in order to sow discord in the west. Listing Russia's attempts to undermine western institutions in recent years, she said: «I have a very simple message for <u>Russia</u>. We know what you are doing. And you will not succeed» [9]. Since Russia's annexation of Crimea from Ukraine, May said Russia had «fomented conflict in the Donbass [eastern Ukraine], repeatedly violated the national airspace of several European countries, and mounted a sustained campaign of cyber-espionage and disruption» [7].

American and British officials said that the attacks disclosed on Monday affected a wide range of organizations including internet service providers, private businesses and critical infrastructure providers. They did not identify victims or provide details on the impact of the attacks. «When we see malicious cyber activity, whether it be from the Kremlin or other malicious nation-state actors, we are going to push back», said Rob Joyce, the White House cyber security coordinator.

Earlier, in February 2018, German officials also accused Russia of hacking attacks on government sites. In particular, according to media reports, hackers from the grouping of APT28, also known as Fancy Bears, at the end of February successfully attacked the German Foreign and Defence Ministries, entered the so-called Berlin-Bonn Information Network (IVBB), which is used by the Federal Chancellery of Germany, the federal ministries and services security, as well as the Bundestag and the Bundesrat [17].

Along with the statements of the official agencies of the United States, Great Britain and Germany, NATO has adopted a consolidated decision on Russia's destabilizing role in the modern world, which is expressed in «a long illegal and illegitimate annexation of the Crimea, violations of sovereign borders with the use of force; intentional destabilization of the situation in eastern Ukraine; the sudden launch of large-scale military exercises contrary to the spirit of

the Vienna Document and provocative military action at NATO's borders, including in the regions of the Baltic and Black Seas and the Eastern Mediterranean; irresponsible and aggressive nuclear rhetoric, as well as repeated violations of Russia's airspace by Allies» [15].

In communiqué after the Warsaw summit NATO has clearly noted that cyber attacks present a clear challenge to the security of the Alliance and could be as harmful to modern societies as a conventional attack. «We agreed in Wales that cyber defence is part of NATO's core task of collective defence. Now, in Warsaw, we reaffirm NATO's defensive mandate, and recognize cyberspace as a domain of operations in which NATO must defend itself as effectively as it does in the air, on land, and at sea. It will support NATO's broader deterrence and defence: cyber defence will continue to be integrated into operational planning and Alliance operations and missions, and we will work together to contribute to their success. Furthermore, it will ensure more effective organization of NATO's cyber defence and better management of resources, skills, and capabilities» [15].

However, these examples of violations of the national cyberspace of the Western powers are just the tip of the iceberg, which hides years of agency activity and attempts to control the media from Russia.

Undoubtedly, Ukraine is the main base for cyber crime and cyber attacks on Russia. This is the meaning of the hybrid nature of the war, which, besides the military component itself, also includes powerful information campaigns, misinformation, fake news and hacking activities.

Purposeful cyber attacks against Ukraine began simultaneously with the events of March 2014, when Russia virtually annexed the Crimea by bringing its troops into the peninsula [8]. At the same time with the annexation of the Crimea in Ukraine began massive DDoS attacks by the so-called CyberBerkut. CyberBerkut is a modern organized group of pro-Russian hacktivists. The group became locally known for a series of publicity stunts and distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks on Ukrainian government, and western or Ukrainian corporate websites [13].

During the period of 2014-2017, about 6,000 hacker attacks were committed against Ukraine [18]. Undoubtedly, the most powerful of the famous cyber attacks took place on June 27, 2017 [3]. A series of powerful cyberattacks using the Petya malware began on 27 June 2017 that swamped websites of Ukrainian organizations, including banks, ministries, newspapers and electricity firms. Similar infections were reported in France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Russia, United Kingdom, the United States and Australia. ESET estimated on 28 June 2017 that 80% of all infections were in Ukraine, with Germany second hardest hit with about 9% (Cyber-attack was about data and not money, say experts, 2017) [5]. On 28 June 2017, the Ukrainian government stated that the attack was halted. On 30 June 2017, the Associated Press reported experts agreed that Petya was masquerading as ransomware, while it was actually designed to cause maximum damage, with Ukraine being the main target [1].

The cyberattack was based on a modified version of the Petya ransomware. Like the WannaCry ransomware attack in May 2017, Petya uses the EternalBlue exploit previously discovered in older versions of the Microsoft Windows operating system. When Petya is executed, it encrypts the Master File Table of the hard drive and forces the computer to restart. It then displays a message to the user, telling them their files are now encrypted and to send US\$300 in bitcoin to one of three wallets to receive instructions to decrypt their computer. At the same time, the software exploits the Server Message Block protocol in Windows to infect local computers on the same network, and any remote computers it can find.

Security experts found that the version of Petya used in the Ukraine cyberattacks had been modified, and subsequently has been named NotPetya or Nyetna to distinguish it from the original malware. NotPetya encrypted all of the files on the infected computers, not just the Master File Table, and in some cases the computer's files were completely wiped or rewritten in a manner that could not be undone through decryption. Some security experts saw that the software could intercept passwords and perform administrator-level actions that could further ruin computer files. They also noted that the software could identify specific computer systems and bypass infection of those systems, suggesting the attack was more surgical in its goal. There also has yet to be discovery of a «kill switch» as there was with the WannaCry software, which would immediately stop its spread. According to Nicholas Weaver of the University of California the hackers had previously compromised MeDoc «made it into a remote-control Trojan, and then they were willing to burn this asset to launch this attack» [2].

During the attack the radiation monitoring system at Ukraine's Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant went offline. Several Ukrainian ministries, banks, metro systems and state-owned enterprises (Boryspil International Airport, Ukrtelecom, Ukrposhta, State Savings Bank of Ukraine, Ukrainian Railways) were affected. In the infected computers, important computer files were overwritten and thus permanently damaged, despite the malware's displayed message to the user indicating that all files could be recovered «safely and easily» by meeting the attackers' demands and making the requested payment in Bitcoin currency.

The attack came on the eve of the Ukrainian public holiday, Constitution Day (celebrating the anniversary of the approval by the Verkhovna Rada (Ukraine's parliament) of the Constitution of Ukraine on 28 June 1996). Most government offices would be empty, allowing the cyberattack to spread without interference. In addition, some security experts saw the ransomware engage in wiping the affected hard drives rather than encrypting them, which would be a further disaster for companies affected by this. A short time before the cyberattack began, it was reported that an intelligence officer and head of a special forces unit, Maksym Shapoval, was killed in Kiev by a car bomb. Former government adviser in Georgia and Moldova Molly K. McKew believed this assassination was related to the cyberattack [10].

On 30 June, the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) reported it had seized the equipment that had been used to launch the cyberattack, claiming it to have belonged to Russian agents responsible for launching the attack. On 1 July 2017 the SBU claimed that available data showed that the same perpetrators who in Ukraine in December 2016 attacked the financial system, transport and energy facilities of Ukraine (using TeleBots and BlackEnergy) were the same hacking groups who attacked Ukraine on 27 June 2017. «This testifies to the involvement of the special services of Russian Federation in this attack» it concluded [14]. Ukraine claims that hacking Ukrainian state institutions is part of what they describe as a «hybrid war» by Russia on Ukraine [12].

According to reports cited in January 2018 the United States Central Intelligence Agency claimed Russia was behind the cyberattack, with Russia's Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) having designed NotPetya [11]. Similarly, the United Kingdom Ministry of Defence accused Russia in February 2018 of launching the cyberattack, that by attacking systems in the Ukraine, the cyberattack would spread and affect major systems in the United Kingdom and elsewhere. Russia had denied its involvement, pointing out that Russian systems were also impacted by the attack [8].

The reaction of the Ukrainian state to such actions by the northern neighbour was predictable. First of all, the role of the Department of Cyberpolice of the National Police of Ukraine, was strengthened - the interregional territorial body of the National Police of Ukraine, which is part of the structure of the criminal police of the National Police and in accordance with the legislation of Ukraine, ensures the implementation of state policy in the field of combating cybercrime. This division specializes in the prevention, detection, termination and disclosure of criminal offenses, the mechanisms of preparation, execution or concealment of which, involves the use of electronic computers (computers), telecommunication and computer Internet networks and systems [20]. On July 19, 2017, within the framework of the project

«Capacity building for cyberpolice», representatives of the OSCE Project Coordination in Ukraine transferred 194 units of specialized equipment to the units of the cyberpolice of the National Police of Ukraine [16].

In addition, repeated cyber attacks have prompted accelerated adoption of the law of Ukraine on protection of cyberspace, which was adopted on October 5, 2017, but came into force only on May 9, 2018 [19].

This Law defines the legal and organizational foundations for ensuring the protection of vital interests of a person and a citizen, society and the state, the national interests of Ukraine in cyberspace, the main goals, directions and principles of state policy in the field of cybersecurity, the powers of state bodies, enterprises, institutions, organizations, persons and citizens in this area, the main principles of coordination of their work on the provision of cyber security.

The law explicitly interprets the meaning of the notion of cyberspace - the environment (virtual space), which provides opportunities for communication and / or implementation of social relations, formed as a result of the operation of compatible (connected) communication systems and the provision of electronic communications using the Internet and / or other networks global data networks [19]; and cyber defense - a set of organizational, legal, engineering and technical measures, as well as measures of cryptographic and technical protection of information aimed at preventing cyber incidents, detecting and protecting against cyber attacks, eliminating their consequences, restoring the sustainability and reliability of the functioning of communication and technological systems.

The law also stipulates that the main subjects of the national system of cyber security are the State Service for Special Communications and Information Protection of Ukraine, the National Police of Ukraine, the Security Service of Ukraine, the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine and the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, intelligence agencies, the National Bank of Ukraine [19].

The objects of critical infrastructure are enterprises and organizations that provide services in the economic sphere, in the energy and chemical industry, transport and information and communication industries, utility companies, healthcare, or objects of potentially dangerous technologies and industries. Coordination of activities is carried out by the President of Ukraine with the help of the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine, which he heads. The Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine ensures the formation and implementation of state policy in the field of cyber security [19].

Thus, the Ukrainian authorities have taken a number of steps to protect the national cyberspace, both normative and practical. However, this does not reduce the level of threats that cyber attacks carry. After all, after the adoption and the enactment of the law on the protection of domestic cyberspace, the creation of the Department of Cyberpolice and a number of other actions by Ukraine, attempts at cyberattacks for our country have not been stopped.

Authorities in the United States said they broke up a potential digital attack called VPNFilter that affected half a million internet routers and could have caused widespread havoc in Ukraine. The US Justice Department said this was the most recent attack programmed by the Sofacy Group, the Russian hackers – also known as Fancy Bear – are suspected of being behind cyberattacks on several governments, international agencies and infrastructure providers. The largest number of infections was in Ukraine but affected routers in 54 countries, according to technology company Cisco Systems and antivirus company Symantec, which cooperated with the FBI during the operation [6].

*Conclusion.* The study of cyberspace as a component of Ukraine's information security gives a number of important conclusions. Cyber security and cyber space of Ukraine remained for a long time out of the attention of domestic researchers and, therefore, civil servants. For more than 20 years, the young Ukrainian state did not waste its efforts on the formation of not

only effective and reliable troops, but also information security. The government did not endeavoured to strengthen the country's defence, and probably only weakened its lack of progress in fighting corruption and the dominance of Russian media and intelligence. As a result, in the spring of 2014, after a long confrontation between the regime and the citizens of Ukraine Viktor Yanukovych, Russia failed to conduct special operations with the aim of annexing the Crimea and facilitate the war in Donbas. Not the least role in this played a raid for information and factors cyber Russian hackers for the purpose of paralysing government agencies and influence on public opinion in Ukraine through Russian-controlled media.

As a result of prolonged and massive cyberattacks, Ukrainian state structures, the banking system, industrial facilities and private business suffered significant material and reputational losses. At the same time in Ukraine began to realize the seriousness of cyber security as a component of national security and contributed to creating cyber police, national cybersecurity strategy, acceptance of a number of regulations on cyber security, strengthening public defence for the protection of domestic cyber space. At the moment, Ukraine is on the way to rethinking the role of cyber security and the formation of a national system of protection against cyber threats.

#### References

1. Bajak F. Companies still hobbled from fearsome cyberattack [Electronic resource] / F. Bajak, R. Satter // USnews. - 2017. - June 30. - Mode of access: https://www.usnews.com/news/business/articles/2017-06-30/companies-still-hobbled-from-fearsome-cyberattack

2. Borys C. Ukraine braces for further cyber-attacks [Electronic resource] / C. Borys // BBCNews. - 26 July. - 2017. - Mode of access: https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-40706093

3. Borys C. The day a mysterious cyber attack crippled Ukraine [Electronic resource] / BBCNews. -2017. July. C. Borvs // \_ 4 \_ Mode of access: http://www.bbc.com/future/story/20170704-the-day-a-mysterious-cyber-attack-crippledukraine

4. Countering Hybrid Threats: Lessons Learned from Ukraine [Electronic resource] / ed. byN. Iancu, A. Fortuna, C. Barna. – Amsterdam, Berlin, Washington: OIS Press, 2015. – Mode of

https://books.google.ee/books?id=Uwy3DAAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&hl=uk#v=onepa ge&q&f=false

5. Cyber-attack was about data and not money, say experts [Electronic resource] // BBCNews. - 2017. - 29 June. - Mode of access: https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-40442578

6. FBI thwarts potential cyberattack on Ukraine [Electronic resource] // Deutsche Welle. - 2018. – 24 May. - Mode of access: http://www.dw.com/en/fbi-thwarts-potential-cyberattackon-ukraine/a-43905916

7. Finkle J. U.S., Britain blame Russia for global cyber attack [Electronic resource] / J. Finkle, D. Chiacu // Reuters. - 2018. - 16 April. - Mode of access: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-britain-cyber/u-s-britain-blame-russia-for-global-cyber-attack-idUSKBN1HN2CK ;

8. MarshS. US joins UK in blaming Russia for NotPetya cyber-attack [Electronic resource] / S. Marsh // The Guardian. – 2018. - 15 Feb. - Mode of access: https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/feb/15/uk-blames-russia-notpetya-cyber-attack-ukraine

9. Mason R. Theresa May accuses Russia of interfering in elections and fake news [Electronic resource] / R. Mason // The Guardian. – 2017. - November 13. - Mode of access:

https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/nov/13/theresa-may-accuses-russia-of-interfering-in-elections-and-fake-news

10. McKew M. A killing in Kiev shows how the West continues to fail Ukraine [Electronic resource] / M. McKew // The WashingtonPost. – 2017. - June 27. - Mode of access: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/democracy-post/wp/2017/06/27/a-killing-in-kiev-shows-how-the-west-continues-to-fail-ukraine/?noredirect=on&utm\_term=.9d530a2446a4

11. Nakashima E.Russian military was behind 'NotPetya' cyberattack in Ukraine, CIA concludes [Electronic resource] / E. Nakashima // The Washington Post. – 2018. - January 12. - Mode of access: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/russian-military-was-behind-notpetya-cyberattack-in-ukraine-cia-concludes/2018/01/12/048d8506-f7ca-11e7-b34a-b85626af34ef\_story.html?utm\_term=.4be7c7c50230

12. Polityuk P. Ukraine points finger at Russian security services in recent cyber attack [Electronic resource] / P. Polityuk // Reuters. – 2017. - July 1. - Mode of acces: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cyber-attack-ukraine/ukraine-points-finger-at-russian-security-services-in-recent-cyber-attack-idUSKBN19M39P

13. Soshnikov A. Inside a pro-Russia propaganda machine in Ukraine [Electronic resource] / A. Soshnikov // BBC Russian. – 2017. - 13 November. - Mode of access: https://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-trending-41915295

14. Ukraine Security Service Blames Russia For Recent Cyberattack. [Electronic resource] // Radio Free Europe. – 2017. - July 01.- Mode of access:https://www.rferl.org/a/cyberattack-ukraine-blames-russia/28589606.html

15. Warsaw Summit Communiqué. NATO[Electronic resource] : Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Warsaw 8-9 July 2016. – 2017. - March 29. - Mode of access:https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official texts 133169.htm?selectedLocale=en

16. Кіберполіція отримала 194 одиниці спеціального обладнання для протидії кіберзагрозам [Електронний ресурс] // Міністерство внутрішніх справ України. - 2017. липня. 19 Режим доступу: http://mvs.gov.ua/ua/news/9208\_Kiberpoliciya\_otrimala\_194\_odinic\_specialnogo\_obladnann ya\_dlya\_protidii\_kiberzagrozam\_FOTO\_VIDEO.htm; Kiberpolitsiia otrymala 194 odynytsi spetsialnoho obladnannia dlia protydii kiberzahrozam [Elektronnyi resurs] // Ministerstvo vnutrishnikh sprav Ukrainy. 2017. 19 lypnia.- Rezhym dostupu : http://mvs.gov.ua/ua/news/9208\_Kiberpoliciya\_otrimala\_194\_odi nic\_specialnogo\_obladnannya\_dlya\_protidii\_kiberzagrozam\_FOTO\_VIDEO.htm

17. Німеччина звинуватила Росію в кібератаці на урядові мережі [Електронний pecypc] // TCH. – 2018. -11 квітня. – Режим доступу: https://tsn.ua/svit/nimechchinazvinuvatila-rosiyu-v-kiberataci-na-uryadovi-merezhi-1138362.html; Nimechchyna zvynuvatyla Rosiiu v kiberatatsi na uriadovi merezhi [Elektronnyi resurs] // TSN. – 2018. – 11 kvitnia. – Rezhym dostupu: https://tsn.ua/svit/nimechchina-zvinuvatila-rosiyu-v-kiberataci-na-uryadovi-merezhi-1138362.html

18. Президент затвердив Стратегію кібербезпеки України. 16 березня 2016[Електронний ресурс] // Президент України : офіційне інтернет-представництво. – Режим доступу :http://www.president.gov.ua/news/prezident-zatverdiv-strategiyukiberbezpeki-ukrayini-36856; Prezydent zatverdyv Stratehiiu kiberbezpeky Ukrainy. 16 bereznia 2016 [Elektronnyi resurs] // Prezydent Ukrainy : ofitsiine internet-predstavnytstvo. – Rezhym dostupu : http://www.president.gov.ua/news/prezident-zatverdiv-strategiyukiberbezpeki-ukrayini-36856

19. Про основні засади забезпечення кібербезпеки України [Електронний ресурс]: Закон України № 2163-VIII від 05.10.2017. – Режим доступу: http://zakon5.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2163-19 ; Pro osnovni zasady zabezpechennia kiberbezpeky Ukrainy [Electronic resource] : Zakon Ukrainy № 2163-VIII vid 05.10.2017. – Rezhym dostupu : http://zakon5.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2163-19

20. Про утворення територіального органу Національної поліції : Постанова Кабінету Міністрів України від 13.10.2015 № 831 // Урядовий кур'єр. – 2015. – 21 жовтня (№ 195) ; Pro utvorennia terytorialnoho orhanu Natsionalnoi politsii : Postanova Kabinetu Ministriv Ukrainy vid 13.10.2015 № 831 // Uriadovyi kurier. – 2015. – 21 zhovtnia (№ 195)

21. США також звинуватили у вірусі NotPetya Pociю [Електронний ресурс] // BBC. – 2018. – 16 лютого. – Режим доступу :https://www.bbc.com/ukrainian/news-43082212; CShA takozh zvynuvatyly u virusi NotPetya Rosiiu [Elektronnyi resurs] // BBC. – 2018. – 16 liutoho. – Rezhym dostupu : https://www.bbc.com/ukrainian/news-43082212

22. Уряд Британії звинуватив Росію у кібератаці на Україну [Електронний ресурс] // BBC. – 2018. – 15 лютого. – Режим доступу :https://www.bbc.com/ukrainian/news-43069110 ; Uriad Brytanii zvynuvatyv Rosiiu u kiberatatsi na Ukrainu [Electronic resource] // BBC. – 2018. – 15 liutoho. – Rezhym dostupu : https://www.bbc.com/ukrainian/news-43069110

23. Через кібератаки США запровадили щодо Росії нові санкції // BBC. – 2018. – 12 червня. – Режим доступу: https://www.bbc.com/ukrainian/news-44450668; Cherez kiberataky SshA zaprovadyly shchodo Rosii novi sanktsii // BBC. – 2018. – 12 chervnia. – Rezhym dostupu : https://www.bbc.com/ukrainian/news-44450668

UDK 327(438) 327(438)

#### **O. Kolomiiets**

# THE GLOBALIZATIONAL PRIORITIES OF THE MODERN FOREIGN POLICY OF POLAND

The article analyzes the globalization priorities of Poland's current foreign policy, revealing their specific differentiation, discreteness and dualism because of internal contradictions between the coalition parties of the country's government, most of which are populist. Currently, the main priorities of Warsaw's foreign policy are pan-European policy within the European Union, ensuring national and regional security within NATO, pursuing its own foreign policy within the Visegrad Group, and implementing a policy of good-neighborliness with the EU neighbors, giving priority to the post-socialist states of Central and Eastern Europe, which chose the European integration vector of development.

The realization by Poland of the pro-Western foreign policy development vector has a positive democratic influence on the country's domestic political development, which has become the basis for the further development of a democratic state.

The modern architecture of the foreign policy of the Republic has two levels - strategic and operational. At the strategic level, foreign policy is determined by the Foreign Policy Strategy of Poland, which is a normative document adopted by the Polish Council of Ministers and reflects the strategic vision of the country's foreign policy priorities for the medium term, usually for five years. At the operational level, in order to respond promptly during the year to the latest challenges and threats in foreign policy, the Head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Poland is developing Annual Recommendations on the Foreign Policy of the country.

Affairs of the Polish foreign community occupy an important place in the bilateral relations of Poland with the countries in which large groups of emigrants from Poland, Polish people or Polish minorities live. The main task of Polonium's policy is to establish mutually

beneficial cooperation between Poland and its diaspora. Warsaw's main task is to provide the Polish foreign diaspora with knowledge in three priority areas: culture - through its development and exchange, science - by appealing to scientific authorities working abroad and the economy - through the development of Poland's economic potential.

The foreign policy of modern Poland acquires distinctive features of the country regional leader, which will displayed on the activities of the Republic in leading international organizations, and manifests itself in relations with the neighboring countries of the EU and the Visegrad Group, the states of the Western Balkans and Northern Europe. These foreign policy imperatives of Warsaw will correctly use in a further scientific research on the prospects for Polish-Ukrainian foreign policy cooperation with the aim of improving its own program of association in NATO and the European Union.

*Key words:* foreign policy, priorities, Poland, Ukraine, European Union, NATO, Visegrad group.

UDK 323.2

I. Lavryk

## ALIENATION AS A FACTOR OF POLITICAL APATHY AND POLITICAL ABSENTEEISM

This article is devoted to the study and analysis of the problem of alienation in the field of policy. In political psychology, alienation is seen as a sense of dissatisfaction, disappointment, and indifference to political leaders, government policies and the political system itself. Political exclusion is the removal of the majority of conscious citizens from the actual processes of the formation of power and control over it, which is considered «natural» inherent in autocratic and totalitarian regimes. The problem of «political alienation» at a given time is one of the most urgent for different political systems: for example, in a democratic society, it is transformed into absenteeism, casting doubt on the legitimacy of the most important institution of a democratic society - free elections.

The process of political exclusion is explored in the most transparent way on the example of the activities of political parties: first, people can come together and discuss common problems, but in order to solve these problems, in communicating with the state and other political institutions, it is necessary to appoint representatives – the set of which is created by the apparatus. Gradually, the party bureau not only take decisions on all issues, but also develops the agenda, issues that need to be discussed and made, decisions are also made by the bureau, and members of a particular organization just only vote for them. That is why, the relationship between the members of the organization and the bureau created by them paradoxically turns over: now the assembly of members must manifest and legitimize the power of the apparatus. Now, the group delegates and appoints the representatives, and the apparatus completely takes over the function of delegation in the form of the appointment of delegates to party congresses, candidates for deputies from a party or organization, which are formally approved at congresses, plenums and meetings. In essence, the phenomenon of «representation of their representatives» is created – deputies or party leaders, who are considered representatives of certain social agents, become representatives of only bureaucracy.

Key words: alienation, apathy, absenteeism, dissatisfaction, political psychology.

UDK 328.184(100)(045)

#### **D.** Lubinets

# ANGLO-SAXON AND CONTINENTAL MODELS OF REGULATING LOBBYISM: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

Lobbyism is an integral element of political system of state and one of the key channels for interaction between civil society and government. The transparency of its activities is a feature of democracy and openness of the process of making political decisions. The mechanism for efficient lobbying is of a special relevance for states with the institute of democracy at the stage of establishment. One of these countries is Ukraine. Despite certain legal basis of lobby work described in the Constitution of Ukraine, certain regulatory acts and numerous attempts to adopt the law in this field, the lobbyism in Ukraine, while existing de-facto stands apart from the legislation. Given this, the analysis of foreign experience of political and legal framework of regulating lobbying, i.e. two main models of its political formulation (Anglo-Saxon and Continental) is relevant.

The object of the article is two main models of regulating lobbying which are Anglo-Saxon (classical) and Continental one (European), the subject is a comparative analysis of two of them. The target of the present research: based on comparative analysis to find out similar and distinct features of political and legal models of lobbyism.

Based on the conducted analysis of legal framework of lobbyism in the countries with Anglo-Saxon (the USA, Canada, Australia) and continental models (Great Britain, Germany, France) the author concludes that both Anglo-Saxon and Continental models of regulating lobbyism foresee the establishment of legal environment to make this political institute function as well as set the limits for the participants of lobbying. Both models are characterized by selfregulation of lobbyism. There are different associations of lobbyists functioning in these countries and they establish their own rules of ethical conduct enshrined in the codes. Main difference of these models is that they provide for separate law on lobbyism, which establishes the procedure of registering and accounting of lobbyists. Laws on lobbying in the countries with Anglo-Saxon model regulate the activities of lobbyists, require obligatory registration of lobby-groups, reports on salary, current expenditures, sources of financing, and set legal limits for lobbyism in this country.

Unlike the Anglo-Saxon model, the Continental model does not provide strict requirements to lobbyists, in the contrary, the legal framework of these states sets legal limitations mostly for public officials in their relations with representatives of civil society, and adopts certain codes of conduct for them. Highly developed political culture, sustainable democratic values are the reason of the absence of abuse in the field of influence on politics, low level of corruption with the absence of separate lobbying legislation.

*Key words: lobbyism, lobbying, corruption, legislation, Anglo-Saxon and Continental models of regulating lobbyism.* 

UDK 352.07(477.62-2)

#### S. Makhsma

# MARIUPOL: STRATEGY 2021 AS WAYS TO IMPROVE THE CITY AND THE COMMUNITY

The article analyzes the existing concepts of the organization development strategy and the existing development strategy of Mariupol city up to 2021. Taking into account the abovementioned concepts there were determined certain advantages and disadvantages. The author develops approaches to the implementation of the strategy, its mission and vision, the principles of the strategy, and the ways of improvement. The article describes elements of this goal and objectives of the project developed with the help of local authorities, foundations and public organizations. The evaluation of intermediate project summary as of September 2018 was also provided.

Keywords: Mariupol, city council, development strategy, community.

UDK 323.173(477)

## O. Pavliatenko

# THE INTERNAL POLITICAL CONDITIONS FOR THE EMERGENCE OF SEPARATISM IN UKRAINE

The hybrid war of the Russian Federation with Ukraine has led to a violation of the territorial integrity of the state and the loss of sovereignty over the territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, the city of Sevastopol and a significant part of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions, which, according to the current legislation, have become temporarily occupied territories.

As a result of armed aggression and hostilities with puppet self-proclaimed republics that are supported financially, resourcefully, militarily and humanely by Russia, Ukraine has faced a wide range of threats and challenges in the security field. Thus, the task of national security as a state policy is to create internal and external political conditions that promote the preservation and strengthening of vital national interests (constitutional order, territorial integrity, inviolability of borders, etc.) from existing or potential opponents.

Assessing the level of separatist threat and counteracting it in the future is impossible without studying all the factors that triggered the emergence and intensification of this phenomenon in Ukraine. Thus, the analysis of the causes of separatism is an urgent task for the scientific and expert community today.

In order to understand the root causes of separatism in Ukraine, in the opinion of the author of the article, it is expedient to analyze the internal political preconditions for its emergence and development, including: the features of the post-totalitarian transformation period, the activity of regional elites, the crisis of national identity, the peculiarities of ethnonational relations, and the pro-Russian position of the representatives of the security structures.

In contemporary security discourse in the context of a hybrid war against Ukraine, it is important to take into account not only external challenges but also the analysis of internal threats that destructively affect the national security of the state. Creating an effective system of countering separatism is an important direction in ensuring it. The necessary steps in this context are the harmonization of legislation in the ethno-national sphere in order to eliminate contradictions between ethnic groups, the formation of a policy of identity as the basis for building a Ukrainian nation, the conscious avoidance of acute political confrontation and the consensus of political elites regarding the national interests of the country and the ways to achieve them. This will ensure the political stability of Ukraine, which can become one of the mechanisms of protection against Russian aggression and separatism in the future.

*Keywords:* separatism, national security, ethnonational relations, national identity, political stability.

**UDK 327** 

#### N. Pashyna, H. Pelykh

#### THE REGIONAL LEADERSHIP AS THE STABILITY FACTOR OF THE MODERN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

The modern world order cannot be imagined without processes of globalization, integration and regionalization. These factors form the basis for the development of modern international relations in the 21st century, which also directly influences to the formation of the external course of world actors.

The transformation of the world political system into multipolar ones has become a new stage in the development of modern international relations. New players appear in the world arena in the form of regional leaders. These countries are characterized with economic, cultural, political, and military peculiarities among the other countries of the region. It allows spreading its influence on other states of the region through economic integration, cultural homogeneity, common political values, and so on. Thus, the study of regional leadership at the present stage is a topical issue.

The definition of a "regional state" is identical with the notion of "regional leader", which is the center of a regional system due to economic, political and military-strategic parameters. India, Iran, Turkey, Pakistan, Brazil, China can be attributed to the countries that hold the policy of a regional leader. However, the status of a regional state should not be a reason to restrict the national interests of other countries of the region. As the center of power in the region, the state should pursue a policy aimed at involving all states in the common integration processes in the region in order to achieve the greatest effectiveness in co-operation and resolving disputes.

*Key words: regional leader, regional state, leadership, globalization, multipolar world, centers of power.* 

#### UDK 314.113(477-074)

#### T. Poiarkova

#### MIGRATIO FLOWS AT OCCUPIED TERRITORIES OF UKRAIN AS A MEANS OF «NEW» WARFARE

In the article the role of migration flows in «hot» military involvements is studied. Modern political science's different approaches to define the reasons of the emergence of migration

processes and their movement are analyzed. In the context of «modern war» notion the role of migrations in military involvements of the XXI century is developed. The reasonability to study the Russian-Ukrainian confrontation in the light of controlled by the RF migration processes is grounded. The main attention is paid to the differenced in forced migrations in the Crimea and the LPR-DPR. It is established that in the Crimea the RF actively changes the demographic situation: forces the Crimean Tatar population to leave; substitute the Crimean political elite by continental Russia expatriates; populates the territory by Russian servicemen. As distinct from the Crimea demographic policy of the RF in the LPR-DPR is of different character: RF's servicemen are sent there to take part in the warfare and return in future. The author analyses the practice of «society compaction» in the LPR-DPR because of population outflow and its «identity separation» from the RF and Ukraine. In the article the conclusions as to the aftermath of RF's demographic policy towards Ukraine, which considerably hampers the return of occupied territories to Ukraine, are grounded.

*Key words: Russian-Ukrainian war, hybrid war, modern war, migrations, annexation of the Crimea, the LPR, the DPR.* 

Modern Russian-Ukrainian war is among the actual scientific themes, in which the attempts to study this conflict through the notion of «hybrid war» are the most popular (S. Datsyuk, G. Potseptsov, S. Rastorguev) [1, 2, 3]. «This is the war, which is often conducted by different from usual means», «where asymmetry of actions let to level the enemy's superiority in armed struggle» [2].

The difference of hybrid war from other wars is in its envelopment of complex of different influences on the enemy of regulated size and combined character, where defense technology is dominating. So, E. Magda in his book «Hybrid war. Survive and win» gives one of the fullest definitions of «hybrid war» as «the whole set of previously prepared and promptly organized military, diplomatic and economic actions, directed to achieve strategic goals» [4, c. 29].

The peculiarities of its development are characteristic for the understanding of the hybrid war's essence that means the nonmilitary influences prevail over the military ones at the initial stage. Subsequently, the important themes of such a military conflict become nuclear control and rapid reaction forces' flexibility. By the time high intensity of new types of wars' first stages regenerates into prolonged conflict, where there is no algorithm to answer the combined influence, that leads to the subordination of one state's interests to another's under the conditions of formal maintenance of the country's political organization.

In spite of rather successful attempts to describe Russian-Ukrainian war as a «hybrid» one, it is necessary to point to the existence of other approaches to the definition of modern military involvements. In favor of mentioned above there is M. G. Penna's remark (made in his book «Microtendencies: Little changes leading to big ones») to the effect that the majority of observers, who focus on only the main tendencies, which reach the «crucial point», miss the fact that today a tendency shouldn't obligatory reach the point to be present and include the high potential of the influence on society [5, c. 502].

In this connection, the direction of political thought provokes interest, where the «modern wars» are studied as the whole set of states' destruction means (Ch. Tilly, M. Crevel'd, M. Kaldor) [6, 7, 8]. In this cluster of scientific researches «modern wars» are regarded as the means to destroy a state that, prejudicing the state's privilege for violence, leads to disappearance of discrimination between government, army and people, and in future will stipulate the change of national state for military ones of other types [7, c. 266].

It is important that the name «modern war» doesn't always reflect its correspondence to the degree of scientific and technical advance. In other words, «modern wars» may be conducted by far not innovative means and may often indicate to a certain degradation of military development. So, such wars are not only characterized by the use of high-precision weapons in hot spots, but by the priority apply to high technologies in information sphere to recode the civilian population's consciousness and changing it into a side of conflict.

All these in whole lead to the fact that the means of «modern war» conducting is the control over the occupied territory's economy, for which purpose they carry out clean-up operations by mass expatriation of population and establishing of neofeudal society on under control territories. All the further warfare stages are determined by the logic of neohierarchical structures, for which purpose pseudodemocratical rhetoric is used. The last one is the reason for converse effect of the international organizations' activity based on the international law.

According to our opinion, the research of Russian-Ukrainian conflict (2014 to nowadays) in the frame of «modern war» notion is perspective because it lets take into account the aftereffects of such strange statehood's destruction as «clean-up operations» leading to demographic migration, «the net result» of which haven't been determined yet» [9, c. 15].

It's necessary to point out that in Ukrainian political science this aspect hasn't been dealt with in a proper way. But in the world practice of political analysis there are researches, where demographic migrations are studied as the events determined by the political influence of migrant as a political subject that lives between two worlds and connects them with each other. So, A. de Tangi in her work «Great Migtation: Russia and Russian People after the Fall of Iron Curtain» specified that migration was the phenomenon with international character because migrants might be effective actors of transnational politics, and migrations might transform the system of international relations forming a new type of spaces, which didn't coincide with national borders [10, c. 18, 19].

S. Pereslegin in his work «Self-help manual of play on "world chessboard» presented the notion «anthropoflows» instead of «demographic migrations» [11, c. 697]. «Anthropoflows» are treated as «social processes carrying identity» and at the same time forming the geopolitical map of the world and are the source of ethnocultural plates' movement.

S. Pereslegin determined such modern kinds of anthropoflows as: 1) «western transfer»-vector, which envelopes the shift of information, business, industrial, democratic, civilizing activity from «east» to «west»; 2) staff- demographic hoover that envelopes compensate the lack of demographic resource at the expense of population relocation from the region with positive birth rate (particular example – «brain drain»); 3) accretion processes – migrations from periphery to centre (to big cultural and industrial centres, which speed up urbanization but help to make anthrodeserts in demographically degraded ethnoses; 4) relaxation migrations – harmonization of ethno-cultural map with new realities of life; 5) induction migrations – relocations in the zone of slow shift of one ethno-cultural plate onto another, in consideration of which society starts the expansion either in the form of migration (representatives of repressed subculture leave their country) or in the form of aggression (leave the country, but armed) [11, c. 697, 698, 700].

A. Neklessa in his work «Anthropoflow in the matrix of geoeconomic universe» treated anthropoflows as essential feature postidustrialization stage corresponding to the new sociocultural situation with new static nature and new classes, as far as states (their rights and sovereignty) are irrelevant (non-topical) for the considerable part of new elite and for other estates existing in the global space [12].

K. Krylov in his article «Identity and anthropoflows» widened the definition of anthropoflows having put into it not only any mass self-sustaining process of identity changes (migration, decline/increase of birth rate, change of national identity, adoption of another religion) but some mass relocations in social space, for example raising or fall of one or another class, social group, stratum, etc. [13].

On the basis of mentioned above K. Krylov distinguished the following types of anthropoflows: 1) inflationary («movement from something») – this is the anthropoflow-escape

(flow of refugees off the territory, mass apostasy of discredited itself ideology or organization, where the final aim is to enter other anthropoflows; 2) singular («movement towards something») – this is the anthropoflow that has a specific purpose: to enter the attractive place («economic migration» to attractive countries); 3) linear anthropoflow (is the super position of singular and inflationary anthropoflows) – the anthropoflow, which has clearly defined beginning and end (e.g. evacuation of civilian population from the theater of war to the rear); 4) «anthropoflow» (anthropoflow-return) reproduces itself: being in this anthropoflow is a part of identity (the history of Jewish people, for whom "expatriation" became the main support of national identity).

Investigation of migration processes in Ukraine first of all shows that forced migration (of 2017 there were 1 493 536 forced migrants from the ATO zone and Crimea) is one of the greatest challenges for Ukrainian statehood [14]. And this happens not only because of additional loads connected with the necessity of giving state support to migrants. This is connected with Russian interpretation of migration processes as the means of control over the territories of «the former USSR's space, which Russia percepts as its natural sphere of influence» [10, c. 17].

This phenomenon gained the most hypertrophied form at the territories under the direct (the Crimea) or indirect (LPR-DPR) the RF's occupational control. So, according to the data of Ukrainian Statistical Services population of the Crimea (before occupation) was about 1 967 thousand people. Crimean Statistical Services (Russian) give data on the 1-st of July, 2014 – 1 884 thousand people, the population rate decline for 83 thousand. On the 01.01.2015 in the Crimea there live 1 896 thousand people, 399 thousand of them live in Sevastopol (as a separate subject of the RF). Totally – 2 295 thousand people. According to the data on the 01.01.2016 the Crimea has 1 907 thousand people, Sevastopol – 416 thousand people, totally – 2 323 thousand people [15]. During the entire occupation of the peninsula, the number of inhabitants increased by more than 100 thousand [16].

The RF actively guides migration processes in the Crimea. On one side, Russia forces out Crimean Tatar population as the mostly loyal to Ukrainian authorities. For this purpose different means are used, among which the political accusation of Crimean Tatars in the supporting of world terrorist organizations is the most influential. Thus, Federal Security Service of Russia gives a special place to Hizb-ut-Tahir organization (which in many countries is considered to be a group acting by violent methods and helping to spread extremist attitude of mind among Muslims and supporting terrorism in consequence of anti-Western ideology) [17].

At the same time there is a gradual exclusion of local Crimean elite consisting of A. Aksyonov's groups (the Head of the Crimean Republic in the RF) and V. Konstatinov's ones(the Head of Crimean), which were formed in 1990s of the XX century. This phenomenon includes several trends. On one side, it strengthens the criticism of local authorities, and in mass media they are making the image of Crimean elite that can't solve the problems of its competence (water supply, power supply, medicine and education). On the other side, Russian authorities encourage the coming of citizens from inland regions and give them privileges in accepting state posts such as getting accommodation and social guarantees [18].

Special attention must be given to the RF's activity in systematic change of demographic balance directed to the formation of a considerable segment of population, which is ready and able to defend «the Russian world» by weapon. We are speaking about large-scale building of record-breaking for servicemen of Russian army in the Crimea.

Thus, in April of 2014 Ministry of Defense of the RF proclaimed the building of 20 thousand flats for servicemen in the Crimea. The flats were built. One part of those flats were given to servicemen, who were transferred to serve at the peninsula, the other part was given to former Ukrainian servicemen, who broke their oath. It should be remembered that 20 thousand flats are at least for 60-70 thousand people.

As the result in the Crimea there is a group of young people, who can use weapon, and this group consists of 150 thousand people, that make 7% of the population, for whom the return of the Crimea to Ukraine is the collapse of their lives [19].

Signed by Russian President V. Putin executive order from 24.08.2016 about the accommodation supply for Russian contactors, who served in Ukrainian army in the Crimea and Sevastopol before they were occupied by Russia, testifies to severity of such a practice. In the document it was said that servicemen must be provided with accommodations or with money to buy or build accommodation [20].

Nevertheless, Russian planned actions as to the correlation of demographic composition in the Crimea challenge the natural resistance of local society to forcible migration pressure that, in its turn, becomes the basis for retention of basic (regional) identity. So, according to the data of the social study conducted by Russia centre «Open Opinion» Crimean space greatly differs in identification marks from all Russian territory [21]. For example, as distinct from Russian regions, every third citizen of the peninsula prefers to be «a Crimean inhabitant» (35%), when in the RF regional identity is found only among 9% of interrogators. In the Crimea less than half of interrogators (43%) consider themselves «citizens of Russia» that differs from the reality of Russian regions, where the same point was chosen by 55% of respondents.

It is demonstrative that in the Crimea about 9% of residents chose the point «citizen of the world, inhabitant of the Earth». In the situation, where distinct correlation of respondent with «citizen of Ukraine» is undesirable, residents of the Crimea in such a way underline their difference in the frames of Russia reality. Thus in the report it is said that among the Ukrainians, Crimean Tatars and representatives of other nationalities the amount of respondents with cosmopolitan self-identification is bigger – 11-15%. In edition, among the Crimean Ukrainians only 28% consider themselves «citizens of Russia».

At the territory of so called LPR-DPR the situation with migration processes is a bit different that is directly connected with warfare. So, on one side, this region is the source of very powerful demographic wave in the form of «forced migrants». On the other side, LPR-DPR are the last point of migration movement from the RF, where Russian manhood arrived to conduct warfare, become the compensatory substitute of demographic decrease of population. Thus, according to the data of American private intelligence company Stratfor's analyst L. Gudrich, in April 2016 there were from 3 to 4 brigades of Russian servicemen. This means that in the east of Ukraine there were about 10 thousand Russian servicemen [22].

It should be taken into account the significant segment consisting of so called unaccounted «volunteers» – «retirees»/»soldiers on leave», who represent different non-state paramilitary formations of Russian citizens. A peculiarity of this demographic vector is high turnover of staff, lack of highly skilled specialists and the priority of monetary reward over motivation [23].

As we can see, the temporary (circular) character of war troops' stay at Ukrainian occupied territories is general for demographic movement (of servicemen and volunteers) and implies the inevitability of return to the RF.

Nevertheless, in this enclave we can see groups of people, who are potential pretenders to long-term settlement in the region. Thus demographic gaps of LPR-DPR are replaced by migrants of Russian origin coming from Russia. They make groups of armed businessmen, the source of existence of which is getting of kickbacks, collection of debts, human trafficking. An impotent fact is an opportunity to occupy dwelling left by refugees. All these in the whole make a halo of attractiveness not only for marginal Russian societies, which didn't find a place for them in Russia, but for Russian servicemen, who don't want to continue their contract service in Russian army and plan to live at the territory of LPR-DPR in future.

As in the Crimea migration pressure of the RF is the reason for LPR-DPR's society's «compaction». All these are catalyzed by the planned disassembling of industrial enterprises at the territory of LPR-DPR. Transportation of the most successful productions to Russia is accompanied by the corresponding migration of these enterprises' workers (often with their families).

In coal-mining industry the situation is more dramatic. Closing of mines leads to marginalization of high-skilled manhood and they reinforce the troops fighting against Ukrainian authority and motivate their choice by the necessity to keep their families. We may only guess about the scale of this phenomenon. Thus, as for January of 2016 on the occupied territory of Donetsk region about 13 mines work and 33 ones were closed. For example, nowadays in occupied Gorlovka and Enakievo all the coal-mining enterprises don't work [24].

Suspension of issuing RF's passports to citizens of occupied Donbass regions, testifying that the RF has refused to recognize LPR-DPR to be independent states, automatically starts the process of formation of their own elites in separatist enclaves. Here the attendant aggressive competition for the rest of resources, at the background of the decline of local oligarchs' influence (because of disassembling of backbone enterprises), only speeds up the process of LPR-DPR people's alienation from Russia and Ukraine. This is clearly seen from the appearance of social stratum, which gets benefit from being outside Russia and Ukraine. That means getting pensions and welfare benefits from two states, benefits from the difference in prices in the central part of Ukraine and its occupied parts, from delivering of certain services in drawing up of documents of the RF and Ukraine. Parasitatity of such groups' existence is stimulated by the opportunity to gain a benefit from the image of military fatalities by means of humanitarian aid and address payments.

Thus, the total reduction in the amount of those, who has left this region (integration of demographic resource), leads to unity of those, who remain. This event is speeded up by several simultaneous processes. Firstly, it is the positioning of Russia people as the citizens of first quality (with higher salaries and opportunity to return home to quiet Russia). Secondly, the strengthening factor is the threat for local residents, who supported the RF and took an active part in the warfare against the Armed Forces of Ukraine using forbidden weapon and breaking all the norms of warfare conducting and upkeep of prisoners of war, to be imprisoned for separatism. Thirdly, all these happen under the influence if inner competition between Russian power structures (e.g. Federal Security Service and Main intelligence directorate of the Russian General Staff), which treat LPR-DPR as the springboard to determine the winner, where the local population is the resource for showdown.

In other words, in occupied enclaves the division on «we» and «they» occurs as along the line of fallout of the control of Ukrainian state and Ukrainian social hierarchy as along the line of «non-coming» into Russian society. Along these lines the introduction of their own passports and license plates, which are not recognized anywhere in the world but play the identification role for «friends», is demonstrative for LPR-DPR. In the Crimea this process isn't so evident and there is a desire to explain all the difficulties connected with entering the RF by the actions of the elite remained from Ukraine.

Degradation to lumpens with attendant primitivization of thinking is inevitable accompanying moment of «social pressing». RF's control over educational sphere stimulates this process and is declared as restoration of integrated «Russian World» on the basis of its traditional religious, social, cultural and moral values with the perspective of entering Great Russia as the halo of Russian World's territories. Means to achieve this goal are presented not only by the total transformation of education in accordance with Russian standards but by the general militarization of educational process. As the result this speed up spreading of values, which are mutually exclusive: soviet attributes are neighbours of Russia Empire nostalgia,

image of Stalin as the preserver of Motherland groups with the dominance of Orthodox Church, etc.

As we can see, the RF controls migration flows at the territories of the Crimea, LPR-DPR and purposefully changes the demographic composition of population that leads to the changes of perception of: 1) territory belonging; 2) time (the present is shifting to the past more and more, resuscitating values, behaviour standards and ideal of Soviet epoch); 3) grounds for identification separating of local population from citizens of Ukraine and Russia.

It should be point out that anthropoflows of the Crimea and LPR-DPR only at first sight have linear character. More attentive study indicates the combination of differently directed migration flows, where considerable mass of relocated Russian population are potential representatives of circular anthropoflows. Thus, in the case of Crimea's , LPR-DPR's statuses' change, carriers of new identification marks and models will be at the territory of Russia and will determine its future for the whole generation.

As to Ukraine, being the result of Russian control over anthropoflows, there is a threat of destructive influence of local regional identity because of outlook diversity on the lines of different time and space sensation and, as the result, different sensation of reality. In the case of incorporation of mentioned above territories changes in social structure, social demands will stipulate the necessity to look for new solutions, and this mean that new functional demands will be the basis for reformatting of Ukrainian state.

In other words returning of the Crimea and LPR-DPR to Ukraine will mean the change game directive (structural crisis) and reformatting of resource base. In this case overcoming of crisis will mean that Ukraine has found the answer for the question about motivation as the anthropoflow-return made of these regions' refugees as for the new development of these territories by youth. The answer should take into account the opportunities of local society to enter modern communicative economy, where creative man is the main value and main resource. Withdrawal from war is determined by the ability of local youth effected by mass media and educational structures of the RF to take like value tolerance to diversification of human behaviour in general and to variety of interpretation concerning the reasons, necessity and inevitability of Ukrainian-Russian war of 2014.

## References

1. Дацюк С. Война России против Украины: три составляющие [Электронный Незалежний pecypc] C. Дацюк культурологічний часопис / 11 «Ï». http://www.ji-Режим доступа magazine.lviv.ua/anons2014/Datsyuk\_Vojna\_Rosii\_protiv\_Ukrainy\_tri\_sostavlyayuschiye.ht m; Datsyuk S. Voyna Rossii protiv Ukrainy: tri sostavlyayushchie [Elektronnyy resurs] / S. Datsyuk // Nezalezhnyi kulturolohichnyi chasopys «Ï». - Rezhym dostupa : http://www.jimagazine.lviv.ua/anons2014/Datsyuk\_Vojna\_Rosii\_protiv\_Ukrainy\_tri\_sostavlyayuschiye.ht m

2. Почепцов Г. Российские аналитические контексты гибридной войны [Электронный Γ. pecypc] / Почепцов. Режим доступа http://hvylya.net/analytics/society/georgiy-pocheptsov-rossiyskie-analiticheskie-kontekstyigibridnoy-voynyi.html; Pocheptsov G. Rossiyskie analiticheskie konteksty gibridnoy voyny [Elektronnyy G. Pocheptsov. Rezhim dostupa resurs] http://hvylya.net/analytics/society/georgiy-pocheptsov-rossiyskie-analiticheskie-kontekstyigibridnoy-voynyi.html

3. Расторгуев С. П. Философия информационной войны / С. П. Расторгуев. – Москва : Московский психолого-социальный институт, 2003. – 496 с. ; Rastorguev S. P. Filosofiya informatsionnoy voyny / S. P. Rastorguev. – Moskva : Moskovskiy psikhologo-sotsialnyy institut, 2003. – 496 s.

4. Магда Е. В. Гибридная война. Выжить и победить (2015) [Электронный ресурс] Харьков E. Виват, 2015. / B. Магда. : 320 c. Режим доступа : http://bookshelf.ucoz.ua/news/magda\_e\_v\_gibridnaja\_vojna\_vyzhit\_i\_pobe dit\_2015\_rtf\_pdf/2016-08-18-13547; Magda Ye. V. Gibridnaya voyna. Vyzhit i pobedit (2015) [Elektronnyy resurs] / Ye. V. Magda. – Kharkov : Vivat, 2015. – 320 s. – Rezhim dostupa : http://bookshelf.ucoz.ua/news/magda\_e\_v\_gibridnaja\_vojna\_vyzhit\_i\_pobedit\_2015\_rtf\_pdf/ 2016-08-18-13547

5. Пенн М. Дж. Микротенденции: Маленькие изменения, приводящие к большим переменам / М. Дж. Пенн, К. Э. Залесн. – Москва : ACT : ACT MOCKBA, 2009. – 510 с. ; Penn M. Dzh. Mikrotendentsii: Malenkie izmeneniya, privodyashchie k bolshim peremenam / M. Dzh. Penn, K. E. Zalesn. – Moskva : AST : AST MOSKVA, 2009. – 510 s.

6.Тилли Ч. Принуждение, капитал и европейские государства. 990–1992 гг. / Ч. Тилли. – Москва : Территория будущего, 2009. – 360 с. ; Tilli Ch. Prinuzhdenie, kapital i evropeyskie gosudarstva. 990–1992 gg. / Ch. Tilli. – Moskva : Territoriya budushchego, 2009. – 360 s.

7. Кревельд ван М. Трансформация войны / М. ван Кревельд. – 2-е изд., испр. - Москва : ИРИСЭН, Социум, 2015. – 320 с. ; Kreveld van M. Transformatsiya voyny / M. van Kreveld. – 2-е izd., ispr. - Moskva : IRISEN, Sotsium, 2015. – 320 s.

8. Калдор М. Новые и старые войны : организованное насилие в глобальную эпоху / М. Калдор. – Москва : Изд-во Института Гайдара, 2015. – 416 с. ; Kaldor M. Novye i starye voyny : organizovannoe nasilie v globalnuyu epokhu / M. Kaldor. – Moskva : Izd-vo Instituta Gaydara, 2015. – 416 s.

9. Шапиро Р. Прогноз на будущее / Р. Шапиро. – Москва : ACT: ACT MOCKBA, 2009. – 537 с. ; Shapiro R. Prognoz na budushchee / R. Shapiro. – Moskva : AST: AST MOSKVA, 2009. – 537 s.

10. Танги А. де. Великая миграция: Россия и россияне после падения железного занавеса / А. де Танги. – Москва : Российская политическая энциклопедия; 2012. – 479 с. ; Tangi A. de. Velikaya migratsiya: Rossiya i rossiyane posle padeniya zheleznogo zanavesa / A. de Tangi. – Moskva : Rossiyskaya politicheskaya entsiklopediya; 2012. – 479 s.

11. Переслегин С. Самоучитель игры на «мировой шахматной доске»: основные понятия геополитики / С. Переслегин // Классика геополитики, XIX век : сб. / сост. К. Королев. – Москва, АСТ, 2003. – С. 680–700 ; Pereslegin S. Samouchitel igry na «mirovoy shakhmatnoy doske»: osnovnye ponyatiya geopolitiki / S. Pereslegin // Klassika geopolitiki, KhIKh vek : sb. / sost. K. Korolev. – Moskva, AST, 2003. – S. 680–700

12. Неклесса А. И. Антропоток в матрице геоэкономического универсума [Электронный ресурс] / А. И. Неклесса, интервью. вел Б. Межуев. – Режим доступа : http://www.rulit.me/books/antropotok-v-matrice-geoekonomicheskogo-universuma-read-420207-4.html ; Neklessa A. I. Antropotok v matritse geoekonomicheskogo universuma [Elektronnyy resurs] / А. I. Neklessa, intervyu. vel B. Mezhuev. – Rezhim dostupa : http://www.rulit.me/books/antropotok-v-matrice-geoekonomicheskogo-universuma-read-420207-4.html

13. Крылов К. Идентичность и антропотоки [Электронный ресурс] / К. Крылов // Государство и антропоток. – Режим доступа : http://www.antropotok.archipelag.ru/text/a122.htm ; Krylov K. Identichnost i antropotoki [Elektronnyy resurs] / K. Krylov // Gosudarstvo i antropotok. – Rezhim dostupa : http://www.antropotok.archipelag.ru/text/a122.htm

14. Як змінилася кількість переселенців в Україні за 2016-2017 рр. [Електронний ресурс] // Слово і діло. Аналітичний портал. — Режим доступу : https://www.slovoidilo.ua/2018/02/02/infografika/suspilstvo/yak-zminylasya-kilkist-pereselencziv-ukrayini-2016-2017-roky ; Yak zminylasia kilkist pereselentsiv v Ukraini za

2016-2017 rr. [Elektronnyi resurs] // Slovo i dilo. Analitychnyi portal. – Rezhym dostupu : https://www.slovoidilo.ua/2018/02/02/infografika/suspilstvo/yak-zminylasya-kilkist-pereselencziv-ukrayini-2016-2017-roky

15. Солодько А. Вимушена міграція та внутрішньо переміщені особи [Електронний pecypc] / А. Солодько, О. Слободян. — Режим доступу : http://www.cedos.org.ua/uk/categories/migration/forced-migration-and-internally-displaced-person ; Solodko A., Slobodian O. Vymushena mihratsiia ta vnutrishno peremishcheni osoby [Elektronnyi resurs] / Andrii Solodko, Oleksandra Slobodian. — Rezhym dostupu : http://www.cedos.org.ua/uk/categories/migration/forced-migration-and-internally-displaced-person

16. Від часу окупації Криму його населення збільшилось на 100 тис. осіб [Електронний ресурс] // Глобал аналітик. – Режим доступу : http://www.globalanalityk.com/noviny/%D0%B2%D1%96%D0%B4-%D1%87%D0%B0%D1%81%D1%83-%D0%BE%D0%BA%D1%83%D0%BF%D0%B0%D1%86%D1%96%D1%97-

%D0% BA%D1% 80%D0% B8% D0% BC%D1% 83-%D0% B9% D0% BE%D0% B3% D0% BE-%D0% BD%D0% B0%D1% 81% D0% B5% D0% BB%D0% B5%D0% BD%D0% BD/ ; Vid chasu okupatsii Krymu yoho naselennia zbilshylos na 100 tys. osib [Elektronnyi resurs] // Hlobal analityk. – Rezhym dostupu : http://www.globalanalityk.com/noviny/%D0% B2%D1% 96% D0% B4-%D1% 87% D0% B0% D1% 81%D1% 83-%D0% BE%D0% BA%D1% 83% D0% BF%D0% B0% D1% 86% D1% 96% D1% 97-%D0% BA%D1% 80% D0% B8% D0% BC%D1% 83-%D0% B9% D0% BE%D0% B3% D0% BE-

%D0%BD%D0%B0%D1%81%D0%B5%D0%BB%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%BD/

17. Антоненко М. Циничная «открытка» из Ростова ко Дню Независимости [Электронный ресурс] / М. Антоненко // Хвиля. – 2016. – 29 августа. - Режим доступа : http://hvylya.net/analytics/politics/tsinichnaya-otkryitka-iz-rostova-ko-dnyu-

nezavisimosti.html ; Antonenko M. Tsinichnaya «otkrytka» iz Rostova ko Dnyu Nezavisimosti [Elektronnyy resurs] / M. Antonenko // Khvilya. – 2016. – 29 avgusta. - Rezhim dostupa : http://hvylya.net/analytics/politics/tsinichnaya-otkryitka-iz-rostova-ko-dnyunezavisimosti.html

18. Роговик О. Сценарії та фактори майбутнього окупованого Криму [Електронний pecypc] / О. Роговик, Є. Соцька // Хвиля. – 2016. – 18 июля. - Режим доступу : http://hvylya.net/analytics/politics/stsenariyi-ta-faktori-maybutnogo-okupovanogo-krimu ; Rogovik O. Stsenariï ta faktori maybutnogo okupovanogo Krimu [Yelektronniy resurs] / O. Rogovik, Є. Sotska // Khvilya. – 2016. – 18 iyulya. - Rezhim dostupu : http://hvylya.net/analytics/politics/stsenariyi-ta-faktori-maybutnogo-okupovanogo-krimu

19. Путин на День Независимости подарил предателям Украины квартиры [Электронный ресурс] // Хвиля. – 2016. – 25 августа. - Режим доступа : http://hvylya.net/news/digest/putin-na-den-nezavisimosti-podaril-predatelyam-ukrainyikvartiryi.html ; Putin na Den Nezavisimosti podaril predatelyam Ukrainy kvartiry [Elektronnyy resurs] // Khvilya. – 2016. – 25 avgusta. - Rezhim dostupa : http://hvylya.net/news/digest/putinna-den-nezavisimosti-podaril-predatelyam-ukrainyi-kvartiryi.html

20. Хусаинова А. Для российских военных в Крыму построили рекордное количество жилья [Электронный ресурс] / А. Хусаинова. – Режим доступа : https://www.vesti.ru/doc.html?id=2650498 ; Khusainova A. Dlya rossiyskikh voennykh v Krymu postroili rekordnoe kolichestvo zhilya [Elektronnyy resurs] / A. Khusainova. – Rezhim dostupa : https://www.vesti.ru/doc.html?id=2650498

21. Казарин П. О чем молчит Крым в российских соцопросах [Электронный ресурс] / П. Казарин // Obozrevatel. – 2016. – 8 августа. - Режим доступа : http://obozrevatel.com/blogs/48953-o-chem-molchit-kryim-v-rossijskih-sotsoprosah.htm ;

Kazarin P. O chem molchit Krym v rossiyskikh sotsoprosakh [Elektronnyy resurs] / P. Kazarin // Obozrevatel. – 2016. – 8 avgusta. - Rezhim dostupa : http://obozrevatel.com/blogs/48953-o-chem-molchit-kryim-v-rossijskih-sotsoprosah.htm

22. В НАТО подтверждают: американская разведка озвучила число российских солдат в Украине [Электронный ресурс] // Obozrevatel. – 2016. – 18 апреля. - Режим доступа : http://obozrevatel.com/crime/69432-v-nato-podtverzhdayut-amerikanskaya-razvedka-ozvuchila-chislo-rossijskih-soldat-v-ukraine.htm ; V NATO podtverzhdayut: amerikanskaya razvedka ozvuchila chislo rossiyskikh soldat v Ukraine [Elektronnyy resurs] // Obozrevatel. – 2016. – 18 aprelya. - Rezhim dostupa : http://obozrevatel.com/crime/69432-v-nato-podtverzhdayut-amerikanskaya-razvedka-ozvuchila-chislo-rossijskih-soldat-v-ukraine.htm

23. Краткий аналитический отчёт по итогам исследования «Открытое мнение – Крым» [Электронный ресурс] // Открытое мнение. Независимый социологический проект. – Режим доступа : http://www.openopinion.ru/news/opublikovan\_kratkiy\_analiticheskiy\_otchyot.html ; Kratkiy analiticheskiy otchet po itogam issledovaniya «Otkrytoe mnenie – Krym» [Elektronnyy resurs] // Otkrytoe mnenie. Nezavisimyy sotsiologicheskiy proekt. – Rezhim dostupa : http://www.openopinion.ru/news/opublikovan\_kratkiy\_analiticheskiy\_otchyot.html

24. Константинов А. Знаю точно, наступать мы не способны: боевики ЛНР отказываются воевать [Электронный ресурс] / А. Константинов // Апостроф. – 2016. – 26 августа. - Режим доступа : http://apostrophe.com.ua/article/society/2016-08-25/znayu-tochno-nastupat-myi-ne-sposobnyi-boeviki-lnr-otkazyivayutsya-voevat/6986 ; Konstantinov A. Znayu tochno, nastupat my ne sposobny: boeviki LNR otkazyvayutsya voevat [Elektronnyy resurs] / A. Konstantinov // Apostrof. – 2016. – 26 avgusta. - Rezhim dostupa : http://apostrophe.com.ua/article/society/2016-08-25/znayu-tochno-nastupat-myi-ne-sposobnyi-boeviki-lnr-otkazyivayutsya-voevat/6986

25. Россия грабит и губит Донбасс дикими темпами [Электронный ресурс] // DDK.DN.UA. – 2016. – 18 марта. - Режим доступа :http://ddk.dn.ua/news/article/5093/ ; Rossiya grabit i gubit Donbass dikimi tempami [Elektronnyy resurs] // DDK.DN.UA. – 2016. – 18 marta. - Rezhim dostupa :http://ddk.dn.ua/news/article/5093/

26. Кількість переселенців із зони АТО і Криму продовжує зростати [Електронний ресурс] // Українські новини. – 2016. – 25 квітня. - Режим доступу http://ukranews.com/ua/news/424759-kilkist-pereselenciv-iz-zony-ato-i-krymu-prodovzhuyezrostaty; Kilkist pereselentsiv iz zony ATO i Krymu prodovzhuje zrostaty [Elektronnyi resurs] Ukrainski novyny. 2016. 25 kvitnia. Rezhvm dostupu // \_ \_ \_ http://ukranews.com/ua/news/424759-kilkist-pereselenciv-iz-zony-ato-i-krymu-prodovzhuyezrostaty

UDK 323 008

## O. Proskurina

# MYPHIOLOGICAL MEASUREMENT OF POLITICAL CULTURE: THEORETICAL BASIS AND POLITICAL PRACTICE

At the center of the study is the strengthening of the myth-making role of the media in modern conditions, with the development of new information channels of communication and modern network systems. The increase in the influence of political mythology is due to the historical circumstances experienced by modern Ukraine, and sets it the task of overcoming the identity crisis, which resulted from the destruction of identity self-identification in a transitional society. It is for the crisis state of society characterized by the spontaneous process of activating myth-creation, without which it is impossible to understand the political events that occur. It is impossible to understand adequately and to correctly predict modern political processes and the development of political culture without the characteristics of political mythology.

It has been established that political myths are most easily established in countries where there are crisis situations and political instability. However, the presence of this pattern does not exclude the affirmation of political myths and in countries with a successful socio-political situation, where the premise is the desire and hope of people as a collective unconscious, which requires appropriate design (including in the myth). Thus, myths exist in authoritarian and democratic societies, but they are based on different mythological logos and reflect different traditions of political culture.

**Key words:** *political myth, political mythology, social myth, cultural archetype.* 

UDK 323.173(045)

## Y. Ryabinin

## SEPARATISM AND METHODOLOGY OF ITS REVEALING

The article is devoted to such a pressing problem as separatism. Some experts say that separatism is a problem of the past, but the author emphasizes that the XXI st century will be the century of identification factor increasing that will influence the nationalistic issues. The author underlines that such phenomena as nationalism, regionalism is the basis of the separatism movements that can lead to military conflicts. It is underlined that the separatism could be catalyzed not only by inner factors but also by outside ones, especially nowadays, when the structure of the world is being changed by the influential actors of the foreign affairs. The author presents the concept that the collapse of the Soviet Union and collapse of the bipolar system of foreign affairs after the end of the Cold war inspired the change of the safety architecture in the whole world. Besides the author highlights the differences between such notions as "separatism" and "secession". It is underlined that catalyst for separatism processes could be any reason that is used by the region population in order to press on the state's government to gain certain rights or for creation of their own independent state. For the first time in political discourse the formula of separatism has been worked out and presented in the article according to which it is possible to predict whether the region is inclined to separatism processes or not. The main factors are enumerated that may become a catalyst of separatism processes in this or that region.

The author emphasizes that taking into account the fact that in the majority of cases almost countries are heterogeneous they have to analyze the possibility of separatism tendencies and process and try to satisfy the needs and demands of the potentially separatism region in order to prevent full scale war and possible collapse of the state.

Key words: separatism, nationalism, secession, separatism formula.

UDK 32.019.51:061.2

#### E. Tatai

## CLASSIFICATION OF PUBLIC ORGANIZATIONS' ACTIVITIES IN THE CONTEXT OF THE RISKS OF THEIR DESTRUCTIVE INFLUENCE ON SOCIETY

Links between NGOs and society are insufficiently discovered in Ukrainian political science discourse. The activities of a public organization are associated with certain minor risks of abuse. This raises the problem of distortion of public organization's activities with negative consequences for the society. The purpose of the article is to classify public organizations' activities in the context of the risks of their destructive influence on the society.

Public-destructive distortion of the influence of a public organization – a situation, in which its activity is not directed at solving social problems or legal satisfaction of members' interests, but instead conceal other interests. This implies: the use of the influence of the organization for political or business competition; suboptimal way of work, in which problem's scale is not reduced and the organization requires continuous funding; exaggeration of the problem to save the organization and get additional finances.

There are two criteria that characterize the impact of organization on the society: the circle of beneficiaries and the type of benefit. According to the first criterion Organization can make a direct influence on it's members only, on certain groups and on the society in general. According to the second criterion it can provide individual benefits, collective benefits as goods, works and services and finally collective benefits as social institutes, rules and norms. rules and regulations due to the limitations they set allows indirect influence on subjects of political or business competition, so risks of hidden competition lie in the creation of social institutions for the whole society and for groups of people. The risks of a continuous funding most concern the provision of individual benefits for groups of people and for the whole society as a result of repeated creation and consumption of such benefits. The risks of over-funding exist in all areas of the NGO's activities, except the provision of individual goods exclusively for its members based on the principles of mutual assistance.

Such a classification of the public organizations' activites contributes better assess and risks prevention in NGO sphere. Risks of public-destructive distortion can be minimized by existing mechanisms of external and internal control.

*Key words*: public organization, collective actions, destructive influence, latent competition, permanent solution of the situation, excessive financing.

UDK 351.865(477)(045)

#### A. Trofymenko

## JOINT FORCES OPERATION IN UKRAINE: ITS POLITICAL AND LEGAL BASIS

The article provides the analysis of political and legal basis of Joint Forces Operation (JFO) in Ukraine based on studying the Law of Ukraine on the Peculiarities of State Policy on Ensuring Ukraine's State Sovereignty Over Temporarily Occupied Territories in Donetsk and Luhansk Regions. The author defines main changes in existing law principles that include: 1)

the Russian Federation is officially called an aggressor and defined as an occupant of a part of Ukrainian territory; 2) so called "DPR" and "LPR" are defined as "occupation government of the Russian Federation"; 3) format of antiterrorist operation changes to "measures on provision of national security and defense, rebuff and control military aggression of the Russian Federation (JFO)". The research defines advantages and disadvantages of law and its significance for the process of de-occupation.

The article studies main differences between the ways of running ATO and JFO. The main difference is that the leadership was changed from the Security Service of Ukraine to the Armed Forces of Ukraine, which expands powers and responsibility of the President of State. In their turn, changes in aims and format of activities of defense and law enforcement agencies in Donetsk and Luhansk regions are not involved, rights of JFO participants is almost identical to the rights of ATO participants.

The author studies the notion of "security zone" which is defined as an area near the combat area as well as provides a list of inhabited localities of this zone. The regime of staying and powers of the commander-in-chief of JFO in this area are also described.

The entry procedure to the JFO region, combat area, limited and prohibited access area are also discussed.

*Key words:* Joint Forces Operation (JFO), Antiterrorist operation (ATO), temporarily occupied territories, «security zone», de-occupation.

UDK 327.82(564.3):061.23

#### M. Trofymenko

# ANASTASIOS G. LEVENTIS FOUNDATION AS A PUBLIC DIPLOMACY INSTITUTE OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS

Today's public diplomacy is an indispensable direction of foreign policy of any modern state that is why studying the experience of the implementation of public diplomacy by small states is of particular scientific interest. Despite limited resources small states can allocate to the implementation of their foreign policy, they are supported by private organizations and foundations established by wealthy people of these states. One of the best examples of making private fund an institute of public diplomacy is a case of Anastasios G. Leventis Foundation located in the Republic of Cyprus. The article analyzes the activities of this foundation from the moment it was established in May 1979 by Cypriot businessman Anastasios Leventis, till now. From the very beginning the main goal of the Foundation was to provide support to education, cultural, art, and charitable projects in Cyprus, Greece and other countries. Moreover, the activities of the Foundation embrace the issues of reconstruction of many classic, byzantine and post-byzantine monuments, enrichment and presentation of Cyprian collections of historical monuments in museums all over the world, regular scholarships and sponsorship for the sustainable development projects and environment-oriented projects in Southern Europe, Africa and around the world. The author notes that the Foundation finances research in the field of history and artistic heritage of Cyprus as well as provides assistance in organizing international congresses, conferences and other events aimed at promoting Cyprian civilization at home and abroad. A.G. Leventis Foundation is also involved in implementation of a wide range of projects aimed at environment protection, scientific and medical research, various cultural and charitable events. Within the framework of these projects, A.G. Levenetis Foundation supports universities with departments involved in Hellenic and Cyprian studies

globally. One of the examples of fruitful cooperation is the one established with Mariupol State University. The support of the Foundation allows improving the facilities of the University and dormitory; to found and enrich Kostantinos Leventis Library, the largest library of Hellenic studies of Eastern Europe with more than 16000 scientific and educational sources; providing MSU students and teachers with scholarship for undertaking internship in Cyprus. Moreover, A.G. Leventis Foundation introduced scholarships for the winners of Pan-Ukrainian Olympiad of Modern Greek Language hosted by MSU and these scholarships are given to the winners annually. The program of summer vacation for Ukrainian schoolchildren was successfully implemented at the initiative of Honorary Consulate General of the Republic of Cyprus in Mariupol and Ministry of Education and Culture of the Republic of Cyprus. All costs were covered by A.G. Leventis Foundation and Ministry of Education and Culture of the Republic of Cyprus.

Key words: Leventis Foundation, public diplomacy, small states, Republic of Cyprus.

UDK 061.2:005.7

#### O. Tupitzya, E. Khudyi

### MANAGEMENT OF NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS: STRATEGY OF POLITICAL EFFICIENCY IN TRANZITIVE SOCIETY

The management of nongovernmental organizations in the context of the development of civil society in Ukraine is considered. The organizational principles of managerial influence on the leadership status of non-governmental organizations are studied. The optimal principles of behavior of civic organizations in the conditions of political transit are determined. The professionalization of management of civil organizations on the basis of increasing influence of political competition is considered. The value of expert knowledge for developing practices of public-political activity is determined. The purpose of the article is to establish the specifics of management by public organizations in the transit society. The attention paid to the quality of management of civic entities for motivating the activity and the possibilities to realize their full potential for defending political demands requires a clear understanding of the existing trends in the development of the community environment. The specificity of cooperation of modern civil society with the state as a bloc of public activity is revealed. The tasks and some public organizations are the introduction of such technologies of efficiency that can correspond to the level of functioning of state and self-governing institutions. The positions and possibilities of approaching public entities to sources of financing and improvement of their mission to a particular community and the state as a whole are considered. The conditions for developing a political platform for public organizations have been established. It is argued that an important feature of public organization management during the transition to democracy is the awareness of the strategic goal of tasks and resources to achieve political political goals. The requirements of the integration of public organizations into public policy and the professional competence of public leaders related to the forecasting of analyzes by assessing the political situation both locally and nationally are determined. The factors of the efficiency of non-governmental organizations activity and their dependence on ability to effectively fulfill their statutory tasks are revealed. The situation of liberal democratic reforms has been studied, which places on non-governmental organizations the task of conforming to the practices of stable democracies, which presupposes the availability of standards of openness. Characterized by the patterns of administrative and policy trends in the relations between the institutes of power and the public.

*Key words: public organizations, management, political forces, civil society, political manipulations.* 

UDK 327.82

Ya. Turchyn, O. Ivasechko.

#### DIPLOMACY WITHOUT DIPLOMATS: CONCEPTUAL PRINCIPLES OF PARADIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY

In the article, the classification of such a modern expression of diplomatic interaction as paradiplomacy and its main forms:trans border regional microdiplomacy, transregional microdiplomacy, global paradiplomacy, and protodiplomacy are considered. Attention is drawn to the three waves of "regions creation" or the three waves of "paradiplomacy" development.

On the basis of conceptual theoretical and methodological generalizations on "paradiplomacy" four basic models of paradiplomatic activity, which are implemented at the level of the regions of the countries are analysed.

Moreover, significant differences between European and American practices in paradiplomatic studies are highlighted. Three main forms of paradiplomacy namely internationalization, transnationalization and cross-border cooperation are described.

The conclusion is drawn to the effect that paradiplomatic activity in addition to intensive interaction with European institutions plays the role of promoter of regional interests at the supranational level, ensures the collection and dissemination of relevant information, stands an important platform for coordinating and consolidating the efforts of the regions, positively affects the qualitative growth of regions as an independent actors in the system of international coordinates, and contributes to the strengthening of their position in relations with the state in the process of interaction with topical global issues.

*Key words: paradiplomacy, protodiplomacy, cross-border cooperation, region, Europe of regions.* 

UDK 323.3-058.1

#### A. Shulika

#### THE POLITICAL POTENTIAL OF THE CONTEMPORARY PRECARIAT

The emergence of the concept of the precariat is primarily due to the emergence and spread of new forms of employment, transition to specialized production and the emergence of the modern system of global division of labor. In the new conditions of enterprises use flexible and decentralized forms of employment relationships, as well as partial or remote employment. Insecurity, anxiety, instability, social and economic status have become a daily problem of a sufficiently large number of people in the modern world.

In the modern socio-labor sphere one of the main problems is the instability of employment and the rapid increase in the layer of economically active people in difficult circumstances. This fact is becoming more widespread in the world, and is a real problem in

the labor markets of many countries. Special attention to this issue is the fact that in recent years it is increasingly strongly affects the political component of society.

The behavior of the representatives of the precariat is based on feelings of dissatisfaction with the current socio-political status anxiety because of the uncertainty of the future, alienation, and anomie. Attitude to their own work devoid of confidence in its social and economic values, hence the fragility of the socio-political status, which eliminates the possibility to form a professional identity that denies many rights and guarantees, the possibility of labor mobility and career growth.

Consolidating factor is the availability of problem situations in the field of access to social security, possession of professional identity and privileges.

In confirmation of this can result in numerous informal relations and network structures of communities, which often arise as a response to the strengthening of reforms and contribute to the development of solidarity actions of the new type. Also due to the fact that political parties and groups in the modern form quite often do not meet the needs of citizens. A means of creating unity, the precariat can serve as alternative principles of self-organization members of the various communities subject to their political identification.

The process of forming groups of the precariat is, in fact, is global and covers a large number of countries.

If we are talking about the analysis of the political potential of the precariat, this process is based on the development of group identity in the socio-political movements that formed around it in recent years. Precariat a heterogeneous political group processes precursor pass through the entire structure of the society in different social groups. However, there are signs of the institutionalization of the precariat and political formation of new subclasses or social groups.

*Keywords:* precariat, a political group socio-political class, stratification, political protest.